Supreme Court Narrows Cybercrime Law

Last week the Supreme Court decided an important case concerning the scope of the federal government’s main cybercrime law, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. I wrote this post about the case, Van Buren v. United States, late last year when it was argued. As I expected, the Court has ruled in favor of the defendant and rejected the government’s sweeping interpretation of the CFAA. That was a welcome development — but the Supreme Court’s Van Buren decision leaves unresolved at least one important question concerning what kinds of computer-related misconduct might still be subject to prosecution.

Van Buren’s Prosecution

This case involves a particular subsection of the CFAA, 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(2)(C). Under that subsection, a person commits a crime if he “accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains information” from that computer. The term “exceeds authorized access” is further defined to mean, “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.” §1030(e)(6). The key issue in the case was what it means to “exceed authorized access” under this provision.

Nathan Van Buren was a police officer in Cumming, Georgia.  In exchange for a bribe, he searched a police database for a vehicle license plate number. The person who paid the bribe, Andrew Albo, told Van Buren the car belonged to a woman he had met and he wanted to be sure she was not an undercover police officer. Van Buren knew that, pursuant to police department policy, he was allowed to use the database only for legitimate law enforcement purposes. What he didn’t know was that Albo was actually cooperating with the FBI in an undercover investigation.

Van Buren was convicted for violating section 1030(a)(2). There was no question he was authorized to access the police database. But the government argued Van Buren had exceeded his authorized access, and thereby obtained the license plate information, by performing the search for an improper purpose – namely, in exchange for a bribe.

Van Buren argued that the CFAA is primarily a computer hacking statute. He claimed the prohibition against exceeding authorized access criminalizes obtaining information from a computer only when a person has no right at all to access that information. It does not apply to obtaining otherwise accessible information for an improper reason – which is what Van Buren did when he ran the license plate number, in a database where he was authorized to be, in exchange for a bribe.

The government had argued for a broader interpretation. It claimed the prohibition against exceeding authorized access applies whenever a defendant was not entitled to obtain the information under the circumstances in which he did — even if he could have properly obtained that same information under other circumstances. Here, Van Buren was authorized to access the database to obtain license plate information for legitimate police purposes. But, the government argued, he exceeded his authorized access when he searched that same database in exchange for a bribe.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett

The Court’s Decision

Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Barrett found that Van Buren had the better of the argument. Much of the opinion is devoted to a detailed parsing of the statutory language. But in the end, it mostly came down to the meaning of one little word: “so.” 

The statutory definition of “exceeds authorized access” prohibits obtaining information that the defendant is not entitled “so to obtain.” The word “so,” Barrett wrote, requires an antecedent; it necessarily refers back to a “word or phrase already employed.” In this statute, she wrote, the antecedent is the act of accessing of a computer. “So to obtain” therefore refers to obtaining information by accessing a computer, as opposed to by some other means. Because Van Buren was authorized to obtain license plate information from this database, he was authorized “so to obtain” the information that he did. Doing so for an improper reason did not exceed his authorized access within the meaning of the statute.  

The government had argued that “so to obtain” prohibits any obtaining of information under circumstances or conditions that were not authorized. The problem with the government’s approach, Barrett wrote, is that  “the relevant circumstance—the one rendering a person’s conduct illegal—is not identified earlier in the statute. Instead, ‘so’ captures any circumstance-based limit appearing anywhere—in the United States Code, a state statute, a private agreement, or anywhere else.”  But, she wrote, the word “so” is not a “free floating term that provides a hook for any limitation stated anywhere.” Van Buren’s approach, which links the word “so” to a specific statutory provision, is the more logical reading of the statute.

Hackers and Gates

The majority agreed with Van Buren that this portion of the CFAA is concerned with “hackers” — a term that the Court uses rather loosely. The prohibition against accessing a computer without authorization applies to “outside hackers,” those who break into a computer system from the outside. The prohibition against exceeding authorized access complements this provision “by targeting so-called inside hackers—those who access a computer with permission, but then ‘exceed’ the parameters of authorized access by entering an area of the computer to which [that] authorization does not extend.” Van Buren was not an “inside hacker,” however, because he did have authorization to be in that database.

The majority also described this approach as a “gates up or gates down” analysis: “one either can or cannot access a computer system, and one either can or cannot access certain areas within the system.” The CFAA is violated when an individual breaches one of these “gates” without authorization. It is not violated when an individual is authorized to open the gate but does so for an improper reason.

The Parade of Horribles

Justice Barrett concluded by noting that the government’s position, if adopted, “would attach criminal penalties to a breathtaking amount of commonplace computer activity.” Much of the oral argument last November had focused on this so-called “parade of horribles.” Van Buren argued that under the government’s interpretation an employee would violate the CFAA by using a work computer for personal emails or online shopping if that was prohibited by company policy. Violating a website’s terms of use policy might also qualify, which could criminalize conduct such as lying in an online dating profile. In short, she concluded, “If the ‘exceeds authorized access’ prohibition criminalizes every violation of a computer use policy, then millions of otherwise law-abiding citizens are criminals.”

“In sum,” Barrett concluded, “an individual ‘exceeds authorized access’ when he accesses a computer with authorization but then obtains information located in particular areas of the computer— such as files, folders, or databases—that are off limits to him.” Because Van Buren did have authority to be in this police database, his use of that database in a way contrary to police department policy did not violate the CFAA.

Justice Thomas
Justice Clarence Thomas

The Dissent

Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. He argued that the plain language of the statute resolved the case. “An ordinary reader of the English language,” he wrote, would agree that Van Buren exceeded his authorized access when he used the police database for an improper purpose. Thomas also argued the majority’s interpretation was contrary to traditional common-law property rules that criminalize the behavior of someone authorized to use another’s property who then exceeds the scope of that authorization.

Thomas noted that the majority’s interpretation placed a great deal of misconduct out of reach of the CFAA. Suppose, he argued, a scientist was authorized to obtain blueprints for atomic weapons under some circumstances. According to the majority, that scientist would therefore be “immune” if he obtained those blueprints for the improper purpose of helping an enemy power.

Finally, Thomas rejected the parade of horribles argument, suggesting that such concerns were speculative and far-fetched: “I would not give so much weight to the hypothetical concern that the Government might start charging innocuous conduct and that courts might interpret the statute to cover that conduct.”

Analysis of the Opinion

As I argued in my earlier post, I think the majority got it right here. Its interpretation is most in line with the overall purpose of the CFAA: preventing unauthorized intrusions into computer files owned by others. And it avoided the interpretation that would have made unwitting criminals of the vast majority of computer users – whether or not such cases would ever be prosecuted. Ruling against Van Buren would have turned the CFAA into a draconian personnel regulation.

I was surprised that the rule of lenity did not come into play in the majority’s decision. Frequently invoked in white collar cases, the rule provides that if there is any ambiguity in a criminal statute the court will err on the side that favors the defendant. It’s based on the rule that due process requires criminal prohibitions to be clear so people can know what is and is not permissible. The majority dismissed the rule of lenity as unnecessary, stating its interpretation was so clearly correct reliance on the rule was unnecessary. In a complex statutory case decided 6-3, I think that displays a certain — lack of humility.  Shocking, I know.

Scene from Casablanca

As for Justice Thomas’s arguments about property law, the majority reasonably pointed out that common law property doctrines – many of which have their roots in medieval England – don’t necessarily adapt well to the area of cybercrime. Better to focus on the precise definitions in this particular statute, which deals with a very specialized area.

Thomas’s concern about the nuclear scientist who sells weapons blueprints being “immune” from liability is not well-founded. Such wrongdoers are not immune; other statutes, such as those against espionage, would easily cover that criminal conduct. There is no need to stretch the boundaries of the CFAA to cover it as well. Van Buren engaged in misconduct and deserved to be punished, but a conviction under the CFAA is far from the only way to do that.

When it comes to the parade of horribles, here I am more inclined to agree with the dissent. Many white collar statutes potentially encompass relatively trivial conduct that, in the real world, is never prosecuted. It’s unlikely that if the case had gone the other way we would have seen a wave of prosecutions of employees for unauthorized Facebook use at work. But here Thomas was swimming against the tide of a Supreme Court trend. In a series of recent decisions the government has argued for broad interpretations of criminal statutes by saying essentially, “trust us – even if this interpretation might criminalize some trivial conduct, we won’t bring those cases.” The Court has refused to go along. Van Buren is in accord with this line of cases.

The 6-3 Breakdown

The breakdown of the Justices in the majority and dissent is interesting.  The newest, Trump-appointed Justices – Barrett, Kavanaugh, and Gorsuch – joined with the liberals – Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan – to form the majority. The other three conservatives – Thomas, Roberts, and Alito – were the dissenters.

All of the conservatives on the Court profess to be textualists, whose decisions are driven primarily by the plain words of a statute. Indeed, Justice Barrett began her analysis by stating: “we start where we always do: with the text of the statute.” Both of the opinions seek support from the same book on statutory interpretation, which was co-authored by the late Justice Scalia, the father of modern textualism. The competing opinions are an interesting study in how even committed textualists can disagree over what the statutory language actually requires.

Some might also have expected the Trump appointees to vote to expand prosecutorial power, not to restrain prosecutors and free a criminal defendant. But decisions in criminal cases frequently do not break down along such ideological lines. Scalia, who is revered by today’s conservative Justices, was a strong voice against the expansive reading of criminal statutes and often ruled in a defendant’s favor. The Van Buren majority’s approach to the case is in the finest Scalia tradition.

gate

What Kind of Gate Will Suffice?

The Van Buren decision does leave one major question unanswered. As noted above, the majority adopts a “gates up, gates down” analysis: the question is whether the defendant was authorized to be inside a particular file, database, or folder, or whether that area of the computer was off limits. But it did not answer a key question: what kind of “gate” will satisfy the statute?

Computer crime expert professor Orin Kerr argued in an amicus brief that the CFAA requires a technological gate. The information must be protected by a password or similar electronic barrier that the defendant breached, or “hacked,” without authorization, even if he was otherwise authorized to be inside the computer system that contained that information. But there are other possible kinds of gates as well, such as those imposed by a contract or office policy.

For example, consider an employee at a large company who works in the purchasing department. He is authorized to access the areas of the company’s computer system that relate to his job, but is not authorized to access employee personnel records that are contained within the same system. If those personnel records are contained in a separate folder that requires a unique password, that would be a technological “hard gate.” If the employee steals that password to access the records, he would exceed his authorized access by breaching that gate.

Now suppose the personnel folder does not require a separate password but is potentially accessible to anyone already inside the company’s computer system. But company policy and the employee handbook clearly prohibit any employee not working in human resources from accessing the personnel folder. If our employee in purchasing accesses the personnel records in violation of that policy, he has breached a “soft gate” – in this case, one imposed not by technology but by a written requirement.

In footnote eight of the opinion, the Court (while citing Professor Kerr’s brief) expressly says it is not resolving this question: “For present purposes, we need not address whether this inquiry turns only on technological (or “code-based”) limitations on access, or instead also looks to limits contained in contracts or policies.” But for now it appears either kind of limit would qualify under the majority opinion. The dissent also interprets the majority opinion that way, arguing that under the majority’s approach an employee could be prosecuted for playing a game of solitaire if company policy prohibited him from opening the “games” folder on his work computer.

The majority opinion and the metaphor of a “gate” suggest there does have to be some kind of barrier or partition, even if that only consists of storing the information in a separate file or folder. It envisions a computer system with different compartments or areas of data. Exceeding authorized access would mean the information obtained would not automatically be accessible to the employee based on his level of access, and he would have to take some additional step to reach it – which could mean simply clicking on a different folder. But exactly what kind of barrier would suffice, and whether some more significant steps by the employee would be required, is left unclear.

Portions of the majority opinion, such as the reference to those who exceed authorized access as “inside hackers,” do imply some kind of technological barrier or hard gate. The majority also criticized the dissent’s interpretation of “so” in part because it could make criminality turn on external factors like office policies outside the statute itself. But if a soft gate is sufficient to define the limits of an employee’s access, then the same issue arises; it’s simply been bumped from the definition of “so” to the definition of “authorized.” That might suggest the majority would require a hard gate if confronted with a case squarely raising that question.

But all that being said, it’s hard to find the requirement of a password or other technological gate in the definition of “authorized.” If an employee opens a folder that his contract or office policy forbid him to open, his actions seem pretty clearly “unauthorized,” even if no stolen password is required.

A requirement of a technological gate to define the scope of authorization would be much cleaner and easier to enforce. But we will have to await future court decisions – or a clarifying amendment by Congress – to learn whether that is required by the statute.

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Rudy and Barr, Back in the News

One hundred days into the Biden administration, two leading characters from the Trump years are making headlines again. Federal authorities executed search warrants at the home and office of Trump’s former attorney Rudy Giuliani, dramatically escalating the criminal investigation into his activities in Ukraine. And a federal judge harshly criticized former Attorney General William Barr and his Department of Justice for engaging in a cover-up concerning Barr’s handling of the Mueller report. The stories were an unwelcome reminder of the abuses that routinely took place during the Trump years, and highlighted that we still have a lot to learn about those abuses.

Rudy Giuliani

The Giuliani Investigation

We’ve known for some time that Rudy Giuliani is the subject of a criminal investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York related to his dealings with Ukraine. Those activities are closely related to the events that led to Trump’s first impeachment, when Trump asked the president of Ukraine to “do us a favor” by providing dirt on Joe Biden’s son in exchange for U.S. assistance. In 2019 Giuliani was actively working in Ukraine to to dig up potentially damaging information concerning Biden, who was considered to be Trump’s most likely rival in the 2020 election.

Giuliani also was actively involved in the successful efforts to have Trump oust the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch, who was notoriously tough on government corruption. Giuliani apparently saw Yovanovitch as an obstacle to his efforts. Her ouster was also a focus of Trump’s first impeachment, and Yovanovitch testified during the House impeachment hearings about Giuliani’s smear campaign against her that ultimately led to her removal.

Prosecutors apparently are exploring whether Giuliani was working not only for Trump but also on behalf of Ukrainian government officials or other Ukrainian individuals. Those Ukrainians may have been seeking favors from the Trump administration or may have wanted the ambassador removed for their own reasons.

The Search Warrants

On April 28th, federal agents executed search warrants at Giuliani’s home and office in New York City. They reportedly seized a number of phones and electronic devices looking for communications, perhaps on encrypted apps.

According to news reports, prosecutors in the Southern District sought to execute the search warrants as early as last summer. Top DOJ officials would have needed to sign off, given the sensitivity involved in searching the office of an attorney for the president. The Barr Justice Department refused to allow it. After Merrick Garland was sworn in as Attorney General, the Justice Department gave the go-ahead.

The most charitable explanation for the Barr DOJ’s refusal to approve the warrants would be DOJ’s unwritten policy to avoid investigative steps within sixty days of an election if they might influence the vote. But if approval was sought last summer, the election was much more than sixty days away. And that policy would not explain why the searches could not have been approved after the election and before Biden’s inauguration.

Last summer was also when Barr sought to remove the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District and replace him with a Trump loyalist. All of this raises suspicions that president Trump’s Justice Department sought to protect Giuliani by stifling the investigation into his Ukraine activities as long as possible – which also, of course, protected Trump himself.

Michael Cohen

Searching an Attorney’s Office

Giuliani and his lawyers responded with predictable outrage over the search warrants. Searching an attorney’s office does raise special concerns, due to the possibility that materials covered by the attorney-client privilege might be seized. But of course a law degree does not confer immunity from the criminal law, and in appropriate circumstances attorneys may be the subject of a search warrant just like anyone else. As with any search warrant, it requires a neutral judge or magistrate to find probable cause that a crime has been committed and that evidence may be located during the search. And the Justice Department has special procedures in place to review requests for such warrants and handle the screening of potentially privileged material.

The Trump years featured another prominent example of such a search: in April 2018 investigators executed search warrants at the home and office of Michael Cohen, president Trump’s former private attorney and “fixer.” Cohen ultimately was indicted on multiple charges, pleaded guilty, and was sent to prison.

As many criminals have learned the hard way, having an attorney involved in your activities does not necessarily mean that everything the attorney touches is privileged. The attorney-client privilege applies only to communications that involve providing legal advice. If an attorney is working as a business person or in some other non-legal capacity, their activities and communications will not be shielded by the privilege. The privilege also contains an exception for communications that are made in the furtherance of a crime or fraud.

After the Cohen search, a judge appointed a special master to review all of the seized materials and screen them for anything privileged before turning them over to investigators. Ultimately only a small amount of material was withheld. Recognizing the sensitivity of these searches and hoping to speed the process along, prosecutors have already asked the court to do the same for the Giuliani materials.

It will take some time for all of the seized materials to be reviewed and we shouldn’t expect anything to happen in the immediate future. But it’s an ominous sign for Giuliani. DOJ is unlikely to take the serious step of searching an attorney’s office without a compelling reason. That’s especially true when that attorney once represented the former president of the United States. Attorney General Garland would be extremely unlikely to sign off on such politically-charged warrants if this were a marginal case.

The Potential Criminal Charges

Much of the news coverage concerning potential criminal charges against Giuliani has focused on his possible violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, or FARA. At least one of the search warrants reportedly mentioned FARA as the potential crime under investigation. That law requires those engaged in political activities in the United States on behalf of a foreign principal to register with the Justice Department. Giuliani may have violated FARA by failing to disclose his work on behalf of various Ukrainian nationals.

Historically FARA was rarely enforced criminally. But the law has gained prominence in recent years, and during the Trump administration and Mueller investigation there were a number of high-profile FARA cases. Former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn was charged with violating FARA for failing to disclose that he was working for the government of Turkey (although he pleaded guilty to a different charge – before ultimately being pardoned). Former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort also pleaded guilty to violating FARA for his undisclosed work on behalf of Ukraine.

But a search warrant does not need to name every crime under investigation, and other charges could be implicated as well. Financial crimes such as tax evasion or money laundering are always a possibility. Manafort, for example, also was convicted of tax evasion and money laundering based on his handling of the money he received from Ukrainians. If you’re keeping your work as a foreign agent a secret, you naturally have an incentive to hide payments for that work from the IRS and other authorities.

Another possibility is public corruption – taking part in a conspiracy to bribe president Trump. The first impeachment was essentially about bribery, although the articles of impeachment did not expressly cite that criminal law. The charge was that Trump offered to release military aid to Ukraine in exchange for that country’s help in digging up damaging information about Biden. This is an allegation of quid pro quo bribery: I will do an official act (release the aid) in exchange for something of value to me (the political dirt on my rival).

Giuliani was at the center of all these activities. He appears to have been working with a number of Ukrainians who were seeking something from president Trump — and may have been willing to offer something in return. Prosecutors could be investigating whether such conduct amounted to a conspiracy to commit bribery. A conspiracy charge would not require that the bribe was ever consummated or successful. Nor would it necessarily require charging Trump himself; Giuliani and others could be charged with simply trying to arrange the quid pro quo transaction.

Whether prosecutors are focusing on charges in addition to FARA is just speculation at this point. But it seems unlikely to me that DOJ would have taken the aggressive and politically explosive step of executing the Giuliani search warrants if they were looking only FARA, a relative technicality. That makes me suspect they are looking at something more substantial.

Would Rudy flip?

One tantalizing prospect that all of this raises is whether Giuliani would cooperate in an investigation of Trump in exchange for leniency. It’s hard to imagine Giuliani turning on the man to whom he has so slavishly linked his own image and reputation. But there are reports that their relationship is strained. Michael Cohen, for one, has opined that Giuliani would flip on Trump to save himself “in a heartbeat.”

There also have been reports that Giuliani is seeking Trump’s help in paying his legal fees and that he has not been paid for much of his legal work on Trump’s behalf. That raises some interesting prospects as well. If Giuliani feels like Trump has stiffed him, he may be more willing to cooperate against the former president. On the other hand, given all that Giuliani knows about Trump’s own potential misconduct, if Trump were to help Giuliani with his legal bills that could look like bribery of a witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 201: Trump paying Giuliani to keep his mouth shut.

Before this is over, Giuliani may end up wishing he had persuaded Trump to grant him a pardon before leaving office.

William Barr
Former Attorney General William Barr

The Barr Cover-Up

On March 22, 2019, special counsel Robert Mueller delivered his 400+ page report to Attorney General William Barr. Barr did not release the entire report, or the detailed summaries that Mueller prepared for that purpose. Instead, two days later he wrote a four-page letter to Congress purporting to summarize Mueller’s conclusions, and held a press conference. He noted that Mueller had declined to make a prosecutorial decision concerning whether Trump obstructed justice. Barr then announced his own conclusion that the evidence presented by Mueller did not establish that crime.

This extremely misleading letter and press conference set the public narrative for the still-secret Mueller report. It allowed Trump to claim he had been completely exonerated and that Mueller had concluded there was “no obstruction, no collusion.” Mueller himself objected to Barr’s characterization of the report which did, in fact, contain substantial evidence of obstruction of justice by the president. But by the time the full redacted report was released three weeks later, Barr’s “spin” had firmly taken hold.   

Barr testified before Congress that he had reached the conclusions in his letter after consultations with the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel and other Department attorneys. The public interest group CREW promptly filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act for documents related to those consultations. Barr’s DOJ withheld a number of documents, claiming attorney-client and deliberative process privileges. One withheld document in particular, a memo to Barr dated March 24, 2019 from Steven Engel in the Office of Legal Counsel and Ed O’Callaghan in the Deputy Attorney General’s Office, was the subject of a federal court ruling last week.

Federal Judge Amy Berman Jackson ruled on May 3 that the memo must be turned over. Much of her opinion deals with the somewhat dry procedural requirements of FOIA. But her conclusions about DOJ’s behavior are damning.

DOJ had claimed the memo was privileged because it involved DOJ attorneys giving legal advice to Barr concerning whether Trump had obstructed justice. Their story was that these attorneys had reviewed Mueller’s lengthy and detailed report on obstruction, formulated their advice to Barr, and written him a memo, which Barr then used to prepare his letter to Congress – all in the space of a couple of days.

Judge Jackson concluded that these claims were false. The memo itself and Barr’s infamous letter to Congress, she found, were all being drafted at the same time and by the same people. And all of those Trump DOJ officials agreed from the outset that Trump should not be charged with obstruction. The memo was not true legal advice to help Barr decide, but apparently was designed to provide legal cover for a decision that had already been made: “the review of the document reveals that the Attorney General was not then engaged in making a decision about whether the President should be charged with obstruction of justice; the fact that he would not be prosecuted was a given.”

Judge Jackson’s conclusion that the fix was in when it came to obstruction of justice doesn’t really come as a surprise to those who followed the Mueller investigation. Before he was named attorney general, Barr – then a lawyer in private practice – wrote a nineteen page memo to the DOJ about why he believed the president could not be charged with obstruction for anything done in his official capacity. Many considered this memo a sort of job application for the attorney general position. When Trump appointed Barr, he was putting in place a final backstop against any potential obstruction of justice charges. And that’s exactly what he got.

“Disingenuous” = “You’re Lying”

Judge Jackson repeatedly accused Barr’s DOJ of being “disingenuous” before the court in its description of the OLC memo. She held that the affidavits submitted by DOJ officials were “so inconsistent with evidence in the record, they are not worthy of credence.” This is essentially a polite way of accusing the department of lying to the court and engaging in a cover-up about the true reasons for Barr’s actions. 

As Judge Jackson noted in her opinion, she is not the first judge to question Barr’s handling of the Mueller report and the credibility of his statements in court. In an earlier case involving the redactions to the Mueller report, Judge Reggie Walton also expressed his “grave concerns” about Barr’s characterizations of the report, which he found were at odds with Mueller’s actual conclusions. He questioned whether Barr had tried to create a “one-sided narrative” about the report in order to benefit Trump.

Barr and the Trump DOJ desperately sought to prevent the truth about Barr’s shielding of the president from coming to light – so much so that they were willing to lie to more than one federal judge about it. It will be interesting to see now whether the Biden DOJ chooses to appeal Judge Jackson’s order that the memo be turned over. They presumably would like the truth about Barr’s actions to be revealed. But depending on their internal review concerning the merits of Judge Jackson’s conclusions, they may feel they need to appeal to try to protect the institutional privileges potentially at stake. Hopefully the full memo will soon see the light of day.

Barr’s effort to use the Department of Justice to protect the president and his cronies was one of the most disturbing aspects of the Trump years. We saw it with Roger Stone and Michael Flynn. And this episode also ties right back in to the Giuliani story, where the Barr DOJ refused to approve the search warrants that could have unearthed evidence implicating Trump.

It’s apparent that we have still more to learn about the corruption within Barr’s DOJ.

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