Charging Foreign Officials Who Take Bribes with Conspiracy to Violate the FCPA

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits U.S. persons and companies from paying bribes to foreign officials to obtain or retain business. The statute applies only to those who pay the bribes, not to foreign officials who receive them. But a recent Supreme Court decision may revive a long-dormant legal theory: charging foreign officials with conspiracy to violate the FCPA.

Congress passed the FCPA in 1977 to combat U.S. companies participating in foreign corruption. In recent years FCPA enforcement has become a major priority for the Department of Justice and the SEC. FCPA cases have resulted in some of the largest criminal and civil fines in history. And although private citizen Donald Trump criticized the law in the past, Attorney General Sessions recently affirmed the Trump administration remains committed to its enforcement.

The FCPA is an unusual corruption statute in at least one respect. Bribery laws generally apply to both sides of a corrupt transaction, prohibiting the receipt of bribes by a public official as well as the payment of those bribes. The FCPA, by contrast, applies only to the bribe payer. Foreign officials who receive bribes may be subject to prosecution in their own country, but the language of the FCPA does not prohibit their actions.

Forty years after the FCPA’s passage, the economy is more global and interconnected than ever. DOJ is much more aggressive about asserting criminal jurisdiction over events that take place primarily in other countries. There are cases where DOJ may want to charge the foreign official accepting FCPA bribes. This may be particularly true when the official has extensive ties to and activities within the United States, or when prosecution in the official’s own country seems unlikely.

Because the FCPA does not apply to the bribe recipients, DOJ must look to other theories to hold them accountable. For example, in some recent cases DOJ has charged foreign officials with money laundering of funds received as part of an FCPA scheme.

But DOJ may have a more direct option: charging foreign officials who receive bribes with conspiracy to violate the FCPA. Conventional wisdom has been that such conspiracy charges are improper. This is based in large part on a single 1991 Court of Appeals case, United States v. Castle. But a recent Supreme Court decision casts doubt on Castle and may breathe new life into the conspiracy theory.

Bribery usually punishes both sides of the corrupt transaction

The Conspiracy Precedent: United States v. Castle

There was a time when DOJ believed it could charge foreign officials with conspiracy to violate the FCPA. In Castle the government used that theory to prosecute four individuals – two U.S. citizens and two Canadian officials. The Americans had allegedly paid the Canadians a $50,000 bribe to secure a contract to provide buses to the Saskatchewan government.

The conduct of the Americans plainly fell within the statute. But the Canadian defendants claimed they could not be charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA. They argued the conspiracy charge was an improper attempt to circumvent Congress’s decision not to criminalize the foreign officials’s conduct.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed. The court said Congress knew any FCPA bribery transaction would necessarily involve a foreign official. But Congress chose not to criminalize the receipt of the bribe. Prosecuting foreign officials for conspiracy, the court held, would amount to an improper end run around this Congressional policy decision.

The Mann Act and Gebardi v. United States

The Castle court relied primarily on a 1932 Supreme Court case, Gebardi v. United States. Gebardi involved a prosecution under the Mann Act, which prohibited the transportation of women across state lines for “immoral purposes.” The Mann Act punished those doing the transporting but did not criminalize the actions of the woman being transported.

In Gebardi a woman agreed to cross state lines with her lover to have sex. When they were charged with conspiracy to violate the Mann Act, she argued the charge was improper. She noted that Congress deliberately chose not to criminalize her conduct in the Mann Act itself. To allow a conspiracy charge, she claimed, would subvert this Congressional decision. The Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the conspiracy case.

The Castle court held that the reasoning of Gebardi squarely applied to the FCPA. Failing to criminalize the receipt of bribes by foreign officials, the court said, represented “an affirmative legislative policy to leave unpunished a well-defined group of persons who were necessary parties to the acts constituting a violation of the substantive law.” Given that legislative decision, it was improper for prosecutors to use conspiracy to charge the foreign officials that the FCPA left unpunished.

Baltimore police were charged with extortion in Ocasio

Conspiracy and Ocasio v. United States

Since 1991 Castle has been widely cited for the proposition that it’s improper to charge foreign officials with conspiracy to violate the FCPA. But the Supreme Court’s decision last term in Ocasio v. United States suggests the high court would not agree.

In Ocasio the defendant was a Baltimore police officer. He, some fellow officers, and the owners of an auto garage took part in a scheme in which the garage owners paid the officers to refer car accident victims to the garage for repairs.

Officer Ocasio and the garage owners were charged with conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act. That act prohibits extortion “under color of official right” by a public official. This is a common federal corruption charge, particularly in cases involving state or local officials.

In Evans v. United States the Supreme Court held that extortion under color of official right is basically equivalent to the receipt of a bribe. But the Hobbs Act applies only to the public official, not to the person who pays. So as interpreted by Evans the Hobbs Act, like the FCPA, is an odd bribery statute: it prohibits only one side of a two-sided corrupt transaction.

In Officer Ocasio’s case, that meant prosecutors couldn’t charge the garage owners with violating the Hobbs Act directly. So they charged the garage owners and the officers with conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act. The government’s theory was that although the garage owners could not violate the Hobbs Act, they were still capable of conspiring to help the officers violate it. In effect, the garage owners were charged with conspiring to help the police officers extort money from the garage owners themselves.

Ocasio argued the conspiracy charge was improper. Part of his argument was similar to that made by the defendant in Gebardi. Although every Hobbs Act extortion case necessarily involves at least two parties, Congress expressly chose not to punish the person who pays the public official. Prosecuting the payer for conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act, Ocasio argued, would undermine this Congressional decision.

Supreme Court precedent supports charging foreign officials with conspiracy to violate the FCPA

The Supreme Court on the Nature of Conspiracy

The Supreme Court disagreed with Officer Ocasio. The Court relied on basic principles of conspiracy law. It noted that conspiracy has always been a separate offense from the underlying crime. In a conspiracy charge, the crime is the agreement itself – the joint undertaking to engage in criminal activity.

Conspiracy does not require that the co-conspirators successfully commit the crime that is the object of the conspiracy. It does not require that each co-conspirator agree to commit or facilitate each and every element of the underlying crime. In fact, a conspirator may be convicted even if he was legally incapable of committing the underlying offense. Conspirators need only agree to help some member of the conspiracy commit the crime.

In Ocasio’s case, the garage owners conspired with the police officers to help the officers violate the Hobbs Act. The Court held this conspiracy theory was sound even though the garage owners, who were not public officials, would be legally incapable of committing extortion under color of official right: “It is sufficient to prove that the conspirators agreed that the underlying crime be committed by a member of the conspiracy who was capable of committing it. In other words, each conspirator must have specifically intended that some conspirator commit each element of the substantive offense.”

The Mann Act Precedents

The Ocasio Court also discussed Gebardi, as well as an even earlier Mann Act case, United States v. Holte (1915). In Holte the Court rejected the claim that it was impossible for the woman transported across state lines to be guilty of conspiracy to violate the Mann Act. The Court gave an example of a prostitute who buys the train tickets, arranges for the travel, and then crosses state lines with a companion. In such a case, the Court said, there was no reason the woman could not be charged with conspiracy even though the terms of the Mann Act did not cover her conduct.

The Court in Ocasio concluded Holte and Gebardi mean that merely participating in a two-sided transaction will not always be enough to charge the person not covered by the statute  with conspiracy. However, there could be cases where the active participation of the other party would rise to the level where a conspiracy charge would be warranted. Gebardi, the Court held, rejected the conspiracy charge not because it was inherently improper but simply because there was no evidence that the woman in that case had actually joined the conspiracy.

The Court concluded: “Holte and Gebardi make perfectly clear that a person may be convicted of conspiring to commit a substantive offense that he or she cannot personally commit. They also show that when that person’s consent or acquiescence is inherent in the underlying substantive offense, something more than bare consent or acquiescence may be needed to prove that the person was a conspirator.”

Charging Foreign Officials with Conspiracy to Violate the FCPA

Ocasio suggests the current Supreme Court would not agree with the Castle court’s reading of Gebardi. Like the FCPA, the Hobbs Act expressly fails to criminalize the acts of one of the two necessary parties in a criminal transaction. The court in Castle held that this Congressional judgment meant a conspiracy charge would always be improper. But the Supreme Court in Ocasio rejected a similar claim.

Castle essentially concluded that Congress’s failure to include foreign officials in the FCPA immunizes those officials from any FCPA-related charge, even under separate statutes. The current Supreme Court is unlikely to be sympathetic to that argument. If Congress wants to pass a statute prohibiting any charges of any kind against foreign officials who accept bribes, it is free to do so. But the Court is unlikely to infer such a broad policy decision from the silence in the FCPA. It is much more likely to find, as it did with the Hobbs Act, that nothing in the FCPA alters the basic law of conspiracy.

This suggests DOJ could properly charge a foreign official who receives bribes with conspiracy to violate the FCPA. The theory would be that the foreign official conspired to help U.S. persons violate the FCPA by bribing that official. Just as the garage owners in Ocasio conspired to help others extort money from the owners, foreign officials could conspire to help others pay bribes to the foreign officials.

This charge would be most appropriate where the foreign official was aggressively encouraging the bribes. As the Court noted in Ocasio, something more than mere passive participation likely would be required to find the officials guilty of a conspiracy. But if they were actively engaged in the scheme, a conspiracy charge may be warranted.

In a case where the foreign official is aggressively demanding bribes, punishment of the official may be particularly justified. The bribe payers arguably are being “shaken down.” They may feel they have little choice but to pay. Charging only the bribe payers in such a case is akin to charging only the victims of extortion in a Hobbs Act case – it may let the most culpable party off the hook.

Of course, cases where DOJ is interested in prosecuting the foreign official may be relatively rare. Where the official is more of a passive recipient, conspiracy charges may not be warranted. In many cases diplomatic, jurisdictional, evidentiary, or other concerns will counsel against filing charges.

But in appropriate cases, DOJ should consider charging foreign officials who accept bribes with conspiracy to violate the FCPA. Ocasio suggests the Department’s legal position more than twenty-five years ago in Castle was correct: conspiracy is a separate crime and there is no barrier to prosecution.

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Why Bob McDonnell Won’t Save Bob Menendez

U.S. Senator Robert Menendez is facing trial this fall on corruption charges. His lawyers will claim the Supreme Court’s recent decision in the Bob McDonnell case means the charges against Menendez cannot stand. But the effect of the McDonnell case on the Bob Menendez trial is likely to be pretty limited.

New Jersey Democrat Menendez and his co-defendant Dr. Salomon Melgen were indicted in April 2015. (You can find my detailed analysis of the indictment here.) The case has been on hold for two years while Menendez pursued claims that his prosecution is barred by the Constitution’s Speech or Debate clause. The trial court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected those arguments. The Supreme Court recently declined to hear his appeal, finally clearing the way for the case to go to trial.

But while Menendez was pursing his Speech or Debate appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court decided McDonnell v. United States. The Court reversed the convictions of the former governor of Virginia, holding that McDonnell did not perform “official acts” as defined by federal bribery law.

Senator Menendez and his lawyers are hoping that McDonnell will breathe new life into his own defense. They will argue that Senator Menendez, like Governor McDonnell, did not agree to perform any official acts. But for Menendez that’s going to be an uphill battle.

Senator Robert Menendez

Senator Robert Menendez

The Charges Against Senator Menendez

The Menendez/Melgen indictment describes a long-term bribery scheme. It charges that Melgen repeatedly provided Menendez with valuable gifts including multiple trips on his private jet, repeated stays at a luxury villa in the Dominican Republic, and hundreds of thousands of dollars in contributions to campaigns and legal defense funds. In exchange, Menendez allegedly interceded on Melgen’s behalf in several different government disputes. The government also alleges Menendez took steps to conceal these facts, including failing to report any of Melgen’s gifts.

The actions Menendez allegedly took on Melgen’s behalf fall into three general categories:

Visas:  In 2007 and 2008, Menendez and his staff contacted various embassy and State Department personnel to help three different foreign girlfriends of Melgen obtain visas to come to the United States.

Port Screening Contract:  Melgen owned an interest in a company that had a contract with the Dominican Republic to provide x-ray screening of cargo entering Dominican ports. The contract, potentially worth many millions of dollars, had been tied up in disputes. Menendez and his staff contacted different State Department officials, urging them to pressure the Dominican government to implement the contract. At one point Menendez met with an Assistant Secretary of State and said he was unsatisfied with the way State was handling the matter. Menendez allegedly threatened to hold a hearing and call the Assistant Secretary to testify.

Medicare dispute:  Melgen, a prominent Florida ophthalmologist, was embroiled for several years in a multi-million dollar dispute over his Medicare billings. He was allegedly using an eye medication designed for a single patient to treat two or three people. He would then bill Medicare as if he had purchased a separate vial for each patient. When Medicare discovered this practice they began pursuing claims against Melgen for overbilling.

Menendez and his staff worked for several years to help Melgen resolve this dispute. Menendez personally met with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and with the acting director of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services to advocate on Melgen’s behalf.

(As I write this, Dr. Melgen is currently on trial in Florida on a separate indictment charging him with Medicare fraud based in part on this scheme. Update: On April 28, 2017, Melgen was convicted on dozens of counts of fraud in the Florida case.)

What will be the effect of the McDonnell case on the Bob Menendez trial?

Former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell

The McDonnell Decision

A jury convicted former Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell and his wife Maureen of multiple counts of corruption in September 2014. The McDonnells accepted more than $170,000 in gifts and undocumented “loans” from businessman Jonnie Williams. In return, prosecutors charged, the McDonnells agreed to promote Anatabloc, a dietary supplement made by Williams’s company, within the Virginia government.

A unanimous panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the convictions. But in June 2016 the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that the steps taken by McDonnell on Williams’s behalf did not constitute “official acts” under federal bribery law. (You can find my more detailed analysis and critique of the Court’s opinion here.)

The Court based its decision on the language of the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201. That statute defines bribery, in part, as a public official accepting something of value in exchange for agreeing to be influenced in the performance of any “official act.” It further defines “official act” as “any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official . . . . ”

The evidence had shown that McDonnell made phone calls on Williams’s behalf, arranged meetings for Williams with other Virginia government officials, and hosted a product launch event for Anatabloc at the Governor’s mansion. The Court held that these actions, standing alone, did not amount to “official acts” and could not support a bribery conviction.

The Court broke its analysis down into two steps, focusing on the precise language of the official act definition. First, one must identify the relevant “question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy” to which the alleged bribe relates. This language, the Court held, connotes a “formal exercise of government power, such as a lawsuit, hearing, or administrative determination.” It suggests something that is “relatively circumscribed – the kind of thing that can be put on an agenda, tracked for progress, and checked off as complete.”

Second, the Court said, the public official must agree to take a “decision or action” “on” the relevant matter, suit or controversy. This requires that the official take some steps to address or decide the matter, or to influence or advise others to do so. In particular, the requirement that the decision or action be “on” the matter – and not merely “about” or “related to” the matter – suggests the official is working to resolve it somehow.

The Court concluded that McDonnell’s actions did not amount to official acts under this analysis. There were several Anatabloc-related issues that could constitute a “question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy.” But simply making phone calls or arranging meetings did not amount to “decisions or actions on” any of those questions. McDonnell introduced Williams to various officials and extended other political courtesies related to Anatabloc. But McDonnell did not himself take steps to resolve any of the matters or pressure others to do so. Accordingly, the Court concluded, a bribery conviction based on McDonnell’s actions could not stand.

Did Senator Menendez Perform “Official Acts?”

Even before McDonnell was decided, Senator Menendez had filed motions arguing he had not performed any official acts. The trial court denied those motions back in 2015. Now, in the wake of McDonnell, Menendez will undoubtedly renew those arguments.

If we follow the Supreme Court’s two-step approach from McDonnell, it’s pretty easy to define the relevant “question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy” for each aspect of Menendez’s case:

1) Should the State Department grant a visa to allow this individual to enter the United States?

2) Should the U.S. government work to persuade the Dominican government to implement the port security contract?

3) Should HHS modify its rules concerning the dosing of a particular eye medication? Or, more specifically, should the Department pursue its claims against Dr. Melgen about alleged overdosing?

Each of these is a circumscribed issue, a question that could be put on an agenda and checked off as resolved. They are the type of specific administrative or policy matters that McDonnell requires.

Menendez will argue that he, like McDonnell, did not take any “decisions or actions on” the defined matters. But Menendez’s actions were much more substantial than McDonnell’s. Menendez did not simply arrange meetings for Melgen or introduce him to other officials. The Senator himself attended various meetings and otherwise advocated for Melgen’s interests. Unlike McDonnell, Menendez was actively engaged in trying to influence the outcome of the matters in question.

An official act must also involve a matter that is “pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official . . . . ” Menendez will also argue that the identified matters were never pending before him and that he did not have the power to decide them. As a result, he will claim, his advocacy on these matters cannot amount to official acts by him.

But the Supreme Court in McDonnell squarely addressed this question. The Court held that a “decision or action” may include influencing another public official who has the power to decide: “decision or action may include using his official position to exert pressure on another official to perform an ‘official act,’ or to advise another official, knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an ‘official act’ by another official.’”

In other words, the official act does not have to be one the defendant himself has the power to resolve. It is sufficient if the defendant attempts to pressure, persuade, or advise another public official to perform an official act.

In the Menendez case the relevant matters were pending before various Executive Branch officials. Their resolution of those questions would constitute official acts. The indictment alleges that Senator Menendez attempted to pressure or persuade those officials to resolve the matters in Melgen’s favor. McDonnell makes it clear that such efforts can be official acts by Menendez,.

Heads I Win, Tails You Lose

Menendez has put himself in a bit of a box with the legal arguments he has already pursued. He argued all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court that the actions he took on Melgen’s behalf were part of his official duties as a U.S. Senator and should therefore be shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause. Courts rejected those arguments because the Speech or Debate Clause shields only legislative activities. Lobbying Executive Branch officials is not protected.

Now Menendez will be arguing that those same actions were so unconnected to his position as a Senator that they could not be official acts. As the government has pointed out, Menendez effectively has argued that nothing a U.S. Senator does can be prosecuted as bribery: if it’s not a legislative act shielded by the Speech or Debate clause, then it’s not an official act and can’t support a bribery conviction. Heads I win, tails you lose.

For example, in their original motion to dismiss based on failure to allege official acts, filed on July 20, 2015, his lawyers argued: “With respect to a U.S. Senator, invoking oversight authority and a threatened use of official powers would be an official act, but it also would be immunized by the Speech or Debate Clause.” (p. 6 fn. 4). But the courts have now rejected the latter half of that claim.

With respect to the Medicare dispute and the port contract issue, the government is indeed alleging that Menendez threatened to hold hearings and otherwise to invoke his oversight authority. Having conceded that these would amount to official acts, it will be a challenge now for the defense to claim otherwise without developing whiplash.

Effect of the McDonnell case on the Bob Menendez trial

As with all criminal trials, the Menendez case is going to come down to the government’s evidence. Menendez may claim that in his interactions with Executive Branch officials he was merely seeking information. He may argue he was not advocating for Melgen or trying to influence those officials. If that turns out to be true, it may be a defense. Merely attending a meeting to gather information would probably not fit the Supreme Court’s definition of official act.

But the government is alleging much more. It intends to prove that Menendez was vigorously advocating on Melgen’s behalf, trying to persuade or pressure Executive Branch officials to decide questions in Melgen’s favor. Such actions would fall squarely within McDonnell and would qualify as official acts by Menendez.

McDonnell’s primary effect will be on the jury instructions. Menendez’s lawyers will not get the case dismissed prior to trial based on the official act issue. Even in McDonnell the Supreme Court did not say it was impossible for any jury to find McDonnell guilty. The problem was that the jury was not properly instructed about the definition of official acts.

The McDonnell case will therefore shape the Menendez jury instructions concerning what the government must prove about official acts. The defense will argue the government has not met its burden. But if it proves the allegations in the indictment, the government should have no trouble meeting the McDonnell standard.

Every public corruption defendant for the foreseeable future is going to seek salvation in the McDonnell opinion. Menendez may have some other viable defenses, including his claim that there was no quid pro quo and that Melgen’s gifts were based simply on friendship. But the McDonnell case and the definition of official act are unlikely to save him.

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Emoluments Clause Violations as a Conspiracy to Defraud the United States

If President Trump violates the Constitution’s Emoluments Clause, what might be the remedy? One possibility is a suit challenging such violations as a conspiracy to defraud the United States.

Since Donald Trump was elected, a great deal of attention has been focused on the Foreign Emoluments Clause. This previously obscure provision forbids federal officials from accepting any gifts or emoluments – payments for services rendered — from a foreign state. President Trump maintains an ownership interest in his far-flung business operations and has resisted calls to divest. As a result, many believe he has been violating the Clause from the moment he was sworn in. (For a more detailed discussion of the Emoluments Clause and what it prohibits, see my earlier post here.)

Just last week there were reports of a new Emoluments Clause issue. The Trump Organization apparently had been in a decade-long legal battle to secure a trademark for the Trump name in China. One month after Trump’s inauguration, China finally granted the trademark – even though doing so may have been a violation of its own regulations. This decision came a few days after Trump publicly reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to a “One China” policy. He had expressed some skepticism about that policy shortly after he was elected. The timing of these events raises obvious concerns about the President’s possible divided loyalties and about foreign governments gaining leverage over him. Given Trump’s extensive international holdings, similar potential issues abound.

The Difficult Question of Standing to Sue

If indeed Trump is violating the Emoluments Clause, who can bring a lawsuit to remedy that violation? Plaintiffs in a lawsuit must have standing, a concrete injury that can be addressed by the court. Finding someone with legal standing is a serious obstacle to enforcing the Emoluments Clause. Some argue that only political remedies (including impeachment) are possible. These commentators believe a court likely would find that any private lawsuit based on the Clause presents a non-justiciable political question.

A public watchdog group called Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) filed a lawsuit shortly after the inauguration, claiming that Trump is violating the Clause. CREW asserts it has standing because Trump’s actions have forced it to devote time and resources to fighting him on these issues.  As a result, CREW maintains, it cannot do much of the other work it would otherwise be doing. CREW has some very prominent attorneys working on the case, but many are skeptical of this standing theory.

Others have suggested a competing business might have standing. For example, if the Bank of China sent all its business to the new Trump hotel in Washington, D.C., a competitor hotel might claim it was injured. But it’s not clear a court would uphold such a private right of action. The Clause’s purpose is to ensure government integrity, not to protect private competitors. And even if standing were found, such a lawsuit likely would face significant hurdles in proving causation and damages.

Image of President Trump at a rally - he may have been violating the Emoluments Clause since day one.

Quo Warranto: A Possible Solution to the Standing Issue

Last week a new legal theory concerning how to enforce the Clause began making the rounds (see articles here and here). Prof. Jed Shugerman at Fordham University Law School first proposed the idea. It avoids the problem of establishing standing to sue President Trump directly. Instead, it focuses on pursuing the Trump Organization for its participation in the President’s receipt of foreign emoluments.

Shugerman notes that states may use a procedure know as quo warranto to bring a civil action against a corporation engaged in illegal behavior. Corporations are creatures of state law, and the state has the power to discipline those that act illegally. For example, New York Business Corporation Law § 1101 allows the state attorney general to bring an action for dissolution against any corporation that has “transacted its business in a persistently fraudulent or illegal manner.” Shugerman argues a state could use this procedure to charge a Trump corporation with serving as a conduit for improper emoluments.

The New York Attorney General would be an ideal candidate to bring such a case, Shugerman says, because the Trump Organization is organized under the laws of New York. If the suit were successful, a court could revoke the Trump Organization’s corporate charter. Shugerman and some others have already filed a letter with the New York Attorney General asking him to consider such a lawsuit. Shugerman believes a number of other jurisdictions could bring similar claims against Trump organizations within their state.

The beauty of Shugerman’s theory is that it avoids the problem of finding private individuals with standing to sue the official violating the Emoluments Clause. Instead it involves public officials – the state attorneys general – filing suit against a private company. There’s no question that the attorneys general have standing to bring such a proceeding. But I think potential legal issues remain.

What Constitutes Illegal Behavior for a Quo Warranto Proceeding?

Prof. Shugerman’s theory faces at least one potential roadblock: proving the Trump Organization or related corporations are conducting business in a “fraudulent or illegal manner” within the meaning of the law. For example, Shugerman suggests a suit could be brought against Trump’s new hotel in D.C. for violating its lease with the General Services Administration. But violation of a lease typically would be considered just a breach of contract, not fraudulent or illegal. It would be surprising if every lease dispute potentially subjected a corporation to an action for dissolution.

Similarly, private corporations typically can’t violate the Constitution, which applies to government actors. So it’s probably unlikely the New York legislature had constitutional violations in mind when it wrote the statute prohibiting illegal corporate behavior. A quo warranto suit based on a constitutional violation would face a strong argument that the statute does not apply.

Even if constitutional violations could serve as the illegal conduct for a quo warranto proceeding, it’s not clear the Trump Organization would violate the Emoluments Clause by receiving gifts from a foreign state. The Emoluments Clause bars only actions by federal officials. On its face the Clause does not prohibit anything done by the Trump Organization or any private company. The corporation is a separate legal entity, even if it does bear Trump’s name.

Prof. Shugerman suggests a state attorney general could hold the Trump Organization liable as the President’s corporate “conduit.” I’m not so sure. In general it’s true that corporations can be held responsible for actions of their agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior (“let the master answer”). This holds true for criminal violations as well as civil. But it’s not clear the same principle should apply when it comes to violations of a constitutional obligation imposed only on a government official.

In addition, under respondeat superior the actions of the agent must be within the scope of his authority. Trump reportedly has turned control of his organization over to his sons. If that’s the case, then he arguably no longer has authority to act on behalf of the corporation. And if that’s true, the corporation could not be held vicariously liable for any of his conduct. When it comes to accepting emoluments the actions are more likely to be taken by Trump’s sons or other corporate officials – but the Emoluments Clause does not apply to them.

In short, I’m not confident that trying to hold the Trump Organization vicariously liable for Trump’s own constitutional violations will work. But all this got me thinking about whether there might be other legal theories under which a state attorney general could argue that Trump-owned companies act unlawfully when they receive emoluments. And that led me to a core white collar criminal statute: conspiracy to defraud the United States.

Image of the US Constitution - the Emoluments Clause is contained in Article I

The Emoluments Clause and Conspiracy to Defraud the United States

The federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, prohibits two types of conspiracies: conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States and conspiracy “to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose.” A conspiracy requires that two or more people knowingly enter into an agreement to achieve an unlawful purpose and that at least one of them takes some action in furtherance of that agreement.

Conspiracy to commit an offense against the U.S. usually means conspiracy to commit a federal crime – conspiracy to commit securities fraud or conspiracy to obstruct justice, for example. But the second prong of the statute, conspiracy to defraud the U.S. “in any manner or for any purpose,” has a broader reach.

To defraud someone usually means to deprive him of money or property. But conspiracy to defraud the United States under section 371 also includes any conspiracy to impair, obstruct or impede the lawful functions of the U.S. government. In Hammerschmidt v. United States in 1924, the Supreme Court held that conspiracy to defraud the U.S.  includes schemes “to interfere with or obstruct one of its lawful government functions by deceit, craft, or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.”

The statute applies to schemes such as disguising transactions to evade some government regulatory program, or hiding assets to thwart the IRS. Individuals can commit the offense even if their underlying conduct, standing alone, would not be illegal. The scheme need not result in any financial harm to the government.

Another important aspect of conspiracy law is that not all co-conspirators need to be capable of committing the underlying offense that is the object of a conspiracy. For example, just last spring the Supreme Court held in Ocasio v. United States that private citizens could be convicted of conspiracy to commit extortion under color of official right. Because they were not public officials, they could not be convicted of the extortion offense themselves. But the Court held they were still capable of agreeing to help a public official commit extortion, and thus could be found guilty of conspiracy.

So with the Emoluments Clause the argument would go like this: the Clause is part of a constitutional structure set up to ensure that officers of the United States are free from outside influences and conflicts of interest. The members of the Trump Organization and foreign government agents who provide benefits to that Organization (and thus indirectly to Trump himself) are impairing, obstructing, and impeding that government function by facilitating the acceptance of improper emoluments by the President. This constitutes a conspiracy to defraud the United States under section 371.

Although corporate officers and foreign agents could not violate the Emoluments Clause themselves, they may conspire to help President Trump violate it. And although their actions may not violate any other law, that doesn’t matter. Those actions may still constitute a conspiracy to defraud the United States by interfering with its proper operations.

This would be analogous to cases involving bribery. Laws against bribery are similar to the Emoluments Clause in that both seek to prevent government officials from being swayed by improper outside influences. Prosecutors have charged schemes to bribe federal officials as conspiracies to defraud the United States. Bribery corrupts the political system and thereby impairs the lawful government functions of the United States. The same is true of violations of the Emoluments Clause.

Image of the Bank of China building. China is one potential source of improper emoluments to President Trump.

Details of a Potential Conspiracy

There are a number of possible co-conspirators in any such case. If we take the China trademark example, co-conspirators could potentially include Chinese officials involved. They could also include any officials within the Trump Organization who took part in the transaction. The Trump Organization itself would be vicariously liable through the acts of those officials. A state attorney general would even have the option of listing the President himself as a co-conspirator. By refusing to divest and by allowing his businesses to accept foreign emoluments, he arguably has joined the agreement.

A conspiracy to defraud must involve some kind of deception or dishonesty. There are a number of possibilities here. Assuming the discussions that led up to something like the China trademark deal are not publicly disclosed, for example, that concealment furthers the scheme to defraud. Other deceptions are likely involved in other potential Emoluments Clause violations. One could even argue that the President’s failure to disclose his tax returns is a part of the deception. By concealing the full scope of his financial holdings and potential conflicts, it helps the conspiracy to succeed.

Of course, it’s not realistic to expect Donald Trump’s own Department of Justice to file a criminal case charging members of the Trump Organization with conspiracy. But that’s not necessary. Building on Prof. Shugerman’s argument, a more promising option is to use conspiracy as a basis to allege fraudulent or illegal corporate behavior in a quo warranto proceeding.

This theory avoids many of the potential quo warranto hurdles discussed above. The unlawful conduct is not the violation of the Emoluments Clause but engaging in a conspiracy to defraud the United States by impeding its legitimate operations. There’s no question that a private corporation is capable of committing that offense. The New York statute quoted above requires that the corporation have engaged in fraudulent or illegal conduct. Participating in a conspiracy to defraud the U.S. fits the bill perfectly.

In a civil proceeding, of course, the plaintiff only needs to prove the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence, a much lower bar than the proof beyond a reasonable doubt required in a criminal prosecution. And civil discovery in such a proceeding could lead to disclosure of a great deal of relevant information, including Trump’s tax returns.

Like so much involving the Emoluments Clause, this theory is novel and untested. But given the purpose of the Clause, the breadth of the conspiracy statute’s ban on conspiracies to defraud the U.S. “in any manner or for any purpose,” and the use of a similar theory in bribery cases, I think it’s a compelling argument. A state attorney general or other litigant contemplating a quo warranto proceeding should consider throwing this conspiracy argument into the mix.

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Selling Access: President Trump, Corruption, and the Legacy of Bob McDonnell

President Donald Trump took office last week amid a storm of controversy over ethics and potential conflicts of interest. There are widespread concerns about possible corruption in the Trump administration. A key focus has been the Emoluments Clause of the Constitution, which forbids federal officials to accept any payments or gifts from foreign governments. Trump’s extensive international business holdings appear to make violations of that clause almost inevitable. (I wrote last November about the Emoluments Clause and how it relates to bribery; you can find that post here.)

Trump recently did announce some steps to transfer control of his businesses to his sons, although it is unclear to what extent that has actually taken place. The head of the U.S. Office of Government Ethics, Walter Shaub, pronounced these efforts wholly inadequate  – and promptly found himself summoned to Capitol Hill to explain his temerity to a Congressional committee. Then this past Monday a public watchdog group and several prominent law professors filed a lawsuit asking a federal court to rule that the new president is already violating the Emoluments Clause.

But the Emoluments Clause is only one of the conflict of interest issues surrounding President Trump. A related ethical concern is the potential for access to the President and his administration to be used as a bargaining chip in his private business dealings. Businesses or governments could secretly agree to provide benefits to Trump-owned businesses in exchange for a private audience with the President or other Executive Branch officials, where they could lobby for government actions that would benefit them. The breadth of the President’s business holdings — and his refusal to divest himself of those holdings – creates an unprecedented risk of such conflicts.

Trump and his family have already demonstrated what might charitably be called a lack of sensitivity to the ethical issues that surround selling access to the White House. In December a nonprofit where Trump’s sons were registered as directors promoted an inaugural event called “Opening Day,” supposedly to benefit unnamed charities related to conservation. It offered donors of $1 million attendance at a private reception with the President-elect, as well as a four-day hunting or fishing excursion with one of his sons. In another incident, a charitable group ran an on-line auction of an opportunity to have coffee with Trump’s daughter Ivanka. The bidding was above $70,000 before the effort was shut down following media inquiries.

Even though the money from such events may go to charity, the buyer’s motives are not necessarily charitable. For example, the high bidder in the auction for coffee with Ms. Trump told the New York Times that he wanted to urge her to persuade her father not to go too far in restricting immigration. Another bidder hoped to speak to her about the Trump administration’s relationship with the Turkish government.

These efforts to sell access to the President and his family raised ethical red flags for a simple reason: access is valuable. Time on any senior government official’s schedule is a scarce commodity. Those able to meet personally with that official (or his family) have an advantage generally unavailable to ordinary citizens: the ability to directly and privately advocate for their own interests. Attempts to cash in on access to government officials – even for charitable causes – are deemed inappropriate because time with those who are supposed to serve all citizens should not be auctioned off to the highest bidder.

But public charity sales of access are just the tip of the potential ethics iceberg. Of far greater concern are transactions that could take place entirely out of public view. For example, imagine this hypothetical: a foreign company is negotiating some kind of deal with a Trump organization business. The company’s officers make it known that they will offer a sweetheart deal at substantial savings if, in exchange, Trump sets up a meeting for them with the Secretary of Commerce to discuss removing certain import restrictions that apply to the company’s products. (Note that because this hypo involves a private company, not a foreign government, the Emoluments Clause would not apply.)

Trump agrees and the deal goes through. Because it involves two private companies, it is not publicly disclosed. Trump then calls the Secretary of Commerce and says, “These guys are friends of mine, I’d like you to meet with them and hear what they have to say about these import sanctions.” Trump doesn’t tell the Secretary about the art of his deal with the company. He also doesn’t tell the Secretary how to decide the question, but the Secretary is no dummy and can read between the lines to see what would please the boss. The meeting happens, the import restrictions are lifted, both sides are happy, and the country is none the wiser.

Remarkable as it may seem, if such a scheme took place it would not violate federal bribery law. And for that, President Trump can thank the former Governor of Virginia – and the U.S. Supreme Court.

Image of Bob McDonnell, former governor of Virginia, whose case paved the way for corruption in the Trump administration

Access for Sale: McDonnell v. United States

Regular readers know that I’ve written a number of posts about McDonnellhere, here, and here, for example – that provide more details about the case. In brief, former Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell and his wife Maureen were prosecuted for essentially selling access to Virginia government officials. Businessman Jonnie Williams was interested in having Virginia universities conduct research on his company’s dietary supplement Anatabloc. Over a two-year period he gave the McDonnells a variety of personal gifts and loans worth more than $170,000.

In exchange, the McDonnells agreed to help promote Anatabloc within the Virginia government. Governor McDonnell arranged meetings for Williams with various government health officials and researchers so Williams could make his pitch. He also held a product launch event for Anatabloc at the Governor’s mansion, attended by state health officials and other government employees.

The McDonnells were found guilty of multiple counts of corruption following a jury trial, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously upheld their convictions. But last June the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that the actions taken by McDonnell on Williams’ behalf were too inconsequential to support a bribery conviction.

The Supreme Court held that simply arranging a meeting, making a phone call, or holding an event did not constitute an “official act” under federal bribery law. An official act, the Court said, requires the public official to take some more substantive steps to resolve a particular question or matter that may be pending before the government, or to pressure another official to do so. Preliminary actions or political courtesies such as arranging a meeting, the Court held, do not rise to that level.

After McDonnell, merely arranging access to government officials may not form the basis of a corruption conviction, even in extreme circumstances. For example, a governor could establish a policy whereby anyone who wanted to meet with a member of his administration had to pay the governor $10,000 to arrange the meeting. Similarly, a company could offer millions of dollars in secret benefits or concessions to a Trump business in exchange for a private dinner with the President or meeting with a Cabinet official. Neither arrangement would violate federal bribery law.

Bribery laws aim to prevent government officials from using their public office to enrich themselves by offering favorable treatment to those willing to pay. Determining whether such a corrupt arrangement exists requires looking at the entire agreement – the quid, the pro, and the quo – and not just focusing on a single side of the equation. The McDonnell decision, through its myopic focus on the meaning of “official act,” effectively took off the table an entire area of public corruption law: the sale of access to government officials.

Image of a bribe taking place - bribery is a key corruption offense

Not All Access is Created Equal

Those familiar with the ways of Washington may observe that access is always up for sale to some extent. It’s just a reality of politics. Large campaign or PAC donors are regularly treated to private events with public officials. For example, large donors to the Presidential Inaugural last week were rewarded with access in the form of a candlelight dinner with Trump and Vice-President Pence at Washington’s Union Station.

This is part of what motivated the Supreme Court in McDonnell. The Court was concerned that if providing access could support a bribery conviction, then many routine interactions with supporters and political courtesies might end up being prosecuted. But again, this mistakenly focuses only on one side of the equation. It’s true that arranging a meeting may be an innocent political courtesy, just as voting on a bill may be a routine political act. But if either is done in direct exchange for a corrupt, secret gift that enriches the politician, that is neither innocent nor routine.

In deciding whether a sale of access might be corrupt, one should consider the whole picture. For example, donations to campaigns take place within a legal framework that generally involves at least some public disclosure and contribution limits. The public is able to see who is supporting the official and to what extent, and to judge the official’s actions accordingly. Sunlight is the best antidote for corruption.

Our current campaign finance system, whatever its flaws, is legal. Contributions made within the framework of that system come with almost a presumption of regularity, and are on a completely different footing from secret, undisclosed gifts. Access may be provided after such contributions, but proving corrupt intent in a case involving lawful contributions will be extremely difficult.

Another distinction is the type of access provided. There’s a big difference between attending a dinner or reception with a few hundred other donors (even by candlelight) and a one-on-one private meeting with an official. The former is more likely to be just a social event where the donors enjoy simply being in the presence of power and perhaps get a chance for a selfie; that is not a setting conducive to corrupt, secret deals.

But the most crucial factor on the quid side of the analysis can be summed up in the immortal words of Watergate’s Deep Throat: follow the money. Campaign contributions go to the campaign, a separate legal entity, as do donations for things such as PACs or Inaugural events. The public official is benefitting indirectly, to be sure, but the support is directed more at the office and campaign and not to line the official’s own pockets.

Contrast this with what Jonnie Williams gave to the McDonnells – secret gifts that enriched the family personally. These were not campaign contributions or other legitimate donations. Rolex watches, New York shopping sprees, and sweetheart loans do not show up on campaign finance reports, are not subject to any legal limits, and personally enrich the official. Unlike routine campaign or PAC contributions, secret gifts to a politician have no legitimate or legally recognized purpose and automatically have the whiff of corruption about them.

The point of all this is simply that it should not be enough to say, “Well, all he did was arrange a meeting, so there can be no corruption.” All of the circumstances surrounding any alleged deal have to be examined. The secret sale of access to public officials causes the exact harm that laws against bribery are intended to prevent: politicians enriching themselves by handing out favors only to those willing to pay. Unfortunately, the McDonnell decision has created a safe harbor for just that kind of corruption.

The Need for Divestiture

Some might suggest this is not a serious problem because there are other potential controls besides the criminal law. For example, the attempts to sell access for charitable causes that I mentioned at the top of this article were exposed and then cancelled. Perhaps the voters and the media can police any such misconduct and shame officials into proper behavior. Ultimately, unhappy voters can always express their displeasure at the ballot box.

But the problem with relying on public pressure and media scrutiny to police such actions is that it assumes full access to information. Most corruption takes place in secret. Although the charitable fundraising efforts were necessarily public, backdoor deals are not. Corruption and conflicts of interest can be very difficult to detect. This is why divestiture of assets that pose a potential conflict is so important: it removes even the possibility of using the power of one’s office to profit off of those assets.

The scenarios outlined here are hypothetical, of course. But the potential for this President to enrich himself and his family through the power of his office is truly extraordinary. With a green light from the Supreme Court, Trump and his family are free to use access to Washington power as a bargaining chip in his private business dealings, taking comfort in the fact that even if their actions come to light, they will not be unlawful.

Yet another way in which the Trump presidency is unprecedented.

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The Emoluments Clause, Bribery, and President Trump

Like a previously unknown contestant on “The Apprentice,” the Emoluments Clause has been catapulted to stardom by Donald Trump. There has probably been more written about this obscure section of the Constitution in the past few weeks than in its entire previous 229-year history. Debate is raging about the meaning of the Emoluments Clause. Many people are saying that president-elect Trump’s foreign business holdings and relationships create a risk — or even a virtual certainty– that he will be embroiled in a constitutional crisis from day one of his presidency.

Some recent commentary has suggested the Emoluments Clause is basically an anti-bribery provision, but this is only partially correct. As a ban on public officials accepting gifts, the clause is indeed related to laws against bribery and conflicts of interest. But the Emoluments Clause differs from bribery in important ways, and those differences have significant implications for President Trump and his new administration.

I should note up front that everyone is sort of flying blind when it comes to the Emoluments Clause. There is basically no precedent concerning the clause and the Supreme Court has never interpreted it. We’ve also never had a president-elect with such extensive foreign business entanglements. For many questions about how the clause would apply to Trump, the most honest answer is, “we’re not entirely sure.” So with that caveat . . . .

What is the meaning of the emoluments clause in the constitution?

What Does the Emoluments Clause Prohibit?

The Emoluments Clause arose out of the framers’ fears about potential foreign influences on their fledgling country. Contained in Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 of the Constitution, it provides:

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States; And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatsoever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

No one is concerned about Trump being granted an office or title from a foreign government, and no one is particularly worried about him receiving presents from Kings or Princes. The most relevant prohibitions are on the receipt of any “present” or “emolument” from a “foreign state.” An emolument is generally defined as a profit, fee, or compensation arising from an office or employment. “Present” presumably has its ordinary meaning of a gift, or something freely given without any strings attached.

Simply put, then, the clause prohibits government officials from accepting gifts or payments from a foreign government.

How Is the Emoluments Clause Related to Bribery?

The crime of bribery requires a quid pro quo. In exchange for something of value, a public official agrees to be influenced in the exercise of the powers of his or her office. Bribery is the quintessential corruption offense; the political process is corrupted because the public official acts not for the good of all but to benefit the person who is paying off the official.

In an op-ed in the New York Times, Professor Zephyr Teachout recently wrote that the Emoluments Clause is “essentially an anti-bribery rule.” Commentators at NPR and The New Republic have said the same thing. But this is not entirely accurate. When it comes to gifts from foreign states, the Emoluments Clause actually is far more sweeping than bribery because it does not require a quid pro quo. Even if the term “emolument” is read to imply compensation in exchange for a particular service (which is far from clear), the term “present” is far broader and contains no such implication.

Unlike bribery, the Emoluments Clause does not require that the public official agree to do anything in exchange for the gift. It doesn’t even require that the gift be linked to some particular official act, as does the federal gratuities statute. In this sense the Emoluments Clause is more akin to a simple gift ban, similar to those contained in most codes of ethics for government employees. It appears to guard against not only actual influence of public officials, as would occur with a bribe, but also the mere appearance of potential influence or divided loyalties that could be created by even a gift.

For a gift from a foreign government to constitute a bribe, President Trump would need to agree to perform some official act or be influenced in the exercise of his powers in exchange. But if a foreign government gave the President a present simply out of admiration, or out of hope that it might curry favor with the President, that would violate the Emoluments Clause even though it would not be a bribe.

In another sense, bribery is broader than the Emoluments Clause because it applies to private parties, not just to foreign states. So if a private foreign corporation or individual gave the President a gift in exchange for some exercise of his official power, that would be a bribe even though it would not violate the Emoluments Clause.

In short, there are many violations of the Emoluments Clause that would not be bribes, and many bribes that would not violate the Emoluments Clause.

Does the Emoluments Clause Apply to the President?

It’s not 100% clear – unlike some provisions of the Constitution, the clause does not specifically name the President and refers only to those holding an “office of profit or trust” under the United States. At least one commentator, Seth Tillman of Maynooth University in Ireland, argues that this and other historical clues suggest the clause was not intended to apply to the President.

But this appears to be a minority view. An “office of profit or trust” under the United States would logically seem to include the presidency. It would be quite strange if the framers did not intend the ban on potential foreign influence to extend to the highest office in the land, where such influences could potentially do the most damage.

Adam Liptak recently wrote in the New York Times about how a newly-elected President Obama sought legal advice from the Department of Justice concerning whether he could accept the Nobel Peace Prize without violating the Emoluments Clause. The DOJ Office of Legal Counsel, in its written opinion, considered it beyond debate that the presidency was “surely” an office of profit or trust under the United States. That seems correct.

bribery

Does Bribery Apply to the President?

Yes. Trump made headlines last week when he told the New York Times that “the President can’t have a conflict of interest.” Federal criminal statutes related to conflicts of interest are contained in the 200-series of Title 18. It’s true that 18 U.S.C. § 202(c)  provides that a number of those laws – including the primary conflict of interest law, 18 U.S.C. § 208, prohibiting acts “affecting a personal financial interest” – do not apply to the President.

But this does not mean it is impossible for a President to have a conflict of interest. Hopefully Trump does not really believe he is free to pursue federal policies designed to benefit his personal financial interests. The universe of concerns about conflicts of interest is not encompassed by the federal criminal code; simply because something may not be a felony does not make it appropriate Presidential behavior. Indeed, the Emoluments Clause itself is plainly animated by a desire to avoid even a perception of potential conflicts of interest.

In any event, unlike the conflict of interest statutes, the President is not exempted from the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201. That law applies to any “officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States,” which certainly includes the President.

donald_trump_27484786540

How Could Trump Violate the Emoluments Clause?

Trump has numerous overseas business ventures and properties, as well as business relationships with many foreign entities. Once he is President, any business transaction with a foreign government that is anything less than completely arms-length could potentially violate the clause. If a foreign government gave him a sweetheart deal on a particular project, or purchased assets or paid rent at above-market rates, or pressured state-owned banks to give Trump favorable loan terms, those could be considered gifts or emoluments. A foreign government could also grant permits or approvals for Trump projects on more favorable terms or cancel investigations related to Trump deals, all of which could be considered financial benefits to Trump.

Some have suggested that even at fair market rates, any foreign government transaction with a Trump business — such as diplomats staying at the new Trump hotel in D.C. — would be payment for a service and therefore a prohibited emolument.

But there are a number of potential qualifications and loopholes. First, the clause only prohibits gifts from a “foreign state,” so gifts from a foreign private corporation would not violate the clause. Presumably a number of Trump’s overseas deals are with private companies and not with governments. (This is why President Obama ultimately was able to accept the Nobel Peace Prize money – the Department of Justice concluded that the prize was coming from a private organization, the Nobel Committee, that was sufficiently independent from the Norwegian government.)

A factual issue could arise concerning whether foreign corporations that are government owned or controlled would be treated as a foreign state for purposes of the clause. The answer should be yes if the clause is not to be completely undermined. (An analogous issue arises under laws such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, where employees of state-controlled private corporations are often deemed to be “foreign officials.”) As Liptak reported, in the opinion for President Obama the Department of Justice noted it believes that corporations owned or controlled by a foreign government are presumptively foreign states for purposes of the Emoluments Clause. Whether this was true in any particular case would likely depend on the degree of state control.

Another issue could arise if a gift was given to the Trump Organization rather than to President Trump personally. Because corporations are generally considered distinct “persons” under the law, a gift to Trump’s corporation might not be considered a gift to the President. But because it is a privately-held corporation, arguably even a gift to the corporation should be deemed a gift to Trump. Some commentators recently argued that gifts to the Clinton Foundation should be considered gifts to Hillary Clinton for purposes of the Emoluments Clause – presumably the same analysis would apply to gifts to the Trump Organization.

A separate question could arise if the present was given to one of the Trump children, or one of their businesses. Assuming they are not holding an office in the new administration, such a gift would appear not to violate the clause. But particularly given the important role Trump’s family seems to play in his administration, the underlying concerns about outside influences and conflicts of interest would certainly still be present. This would seem to violate the spirit of the clause, if not the letter.

Finally, it appears that Congress could simply give Trump a pass on all of this. The Emoluments Clause provides that presents or emoluments may not be accepted “without the consent of Congress.” That suggests Congress could pass some kind of blanket permission for President Trump to pursue his businesses without worrying about the clause. How something like that would play politically would be another matter.

What Is the Remedy for a Violation of the Emoluments Clause?

There’s probably a reason there are no court cases interpreting the Emoluments Clause: most commentators think it is non-justiciable. In other words, no one would have standing to bring a lawsuit and a court would not be able to fashion a workable remedy. As Professor Jonathan Adler noted in the Volokh Conspiracy blog, if the clause is violated “the only remedies will be political.”

Political remedies include elections. If voters are upset by President Trump’s foreign entanglements they could toss him out of office in four years. Political remedies could also include hearings on Capitol Hill. Congress could issue sternly-worded resolutions of disapproval that Trump could dismiss with a Tweet storm. Congress presumably could pass legislation that would impose some restrictions consistent with the clause, although enforcing it would again be problematic.

Or political remedies could include impeachment.

Is Violating the Emoluments Clause an Impeachable Offense?

The Impeachment Clause, Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution, provides:

The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

Although it’s not a crime, a violation of the Emoluments Clause most likely is an impeachable offense. The phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors” is generally understood to refer not to criminal law but to political violations and misconduct related to public office. Impeachment is a political process, not a criminal one. As Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 65, impeachable offenses “proceed from the misconduct of public men . . . from the abuse or violation of some public trust.”

That being said, the meaning of the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors” is not completely settled. There was a lot of debate about it during the impeachment of President Bill Clinton. Clinton’s lawyers argued that “high crimes and misdemeanors” meant misconduct related to the exercise of public office. They maintained that Clinton’s behavior in his personal life did not meet that standard. Congress, of course, ultimately disagreed.

But a violation of the Emoluments Clause would be directly related to the exercise of Trump’s public office and his abuse of that trust. As such it should qualify as a “high crime or misdemeanor.” It would be strange indeed if the framers included the prohibition against emoluments but contemplated no possible remedy for its violation. The most logical remedy is impeachment.

And in the end, as then-Congressman Gerald Ford famously remarked, “An impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history.” If Congress were to conclude that a violation of the Emoluments Clause was (or was not) an impeachable offense, there would be no real way to challenge that conclusion.

What Would Be the Remedy if Trump Committed Bribery?

If President Trump were to violate federal bribery law, the issue again would be the proper remedy. Whether or not a sitting President can be indicted is another question that was debated during the Bill Clinton investigation and has never been fully resolved. The Supreme Court did rule in the Paula Jones case, Clinton v. Jonesthat a President is not immune from civil litigation based on events that took place before he took office, but that is a different matter.

Indicting a sitting President raises far thornier issues. How would the President’s own Justice Department and Attorney General prosecute a criminal case against the President? Could the federal courts hear such a case without violating the separation of powers? What if a sitting President were convicted and sent to prison while still in office? And could a convicted President Trump pardon himself?

For all of these reasons, the better view is probably that a sitting President cannot be indicted for a crime. (This is also the official position of the Department of Justice.) The appropriate remedy for a President who commits criminal acts would once again be the impeachment process. In fact the Impeachment Clause (quoted above) specifically lists bribery as one of the grounds for impeachment.

If a President were impeached for bribery and removed from office, then presumably criminal bribery charges could be pursued against him or her as a private citizen. Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of the Constitution provides that after removal by impeachment an official “shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.” But again, we are in uncharted waters.

Bottom Line – The Meaning of the Emoluments Clause

The Emoluments Clause is far more sweeping than the laws against bribery, at least when it comes to gifts from foreign governments. Almost any transaction involving Trump businesses and a foreign state or state-controlled entity is going to raise questions about whether any improper emolument was involved, even if Trump did not agree to do anything in return.

For any violation of either bribery law or the Emoluments Clause, the likely remedy is impeachment, not a lawsuit or criminal charges. And for those who believe a Republican Congress would never impeach a Republican President, bear in mind that if Trump were removed from office that would leave us with: President Pence.

That might be an outcome many Republicans would find very desirable.

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White Collar Crime, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Supreme Court

Does the Supreme Court still believe in prosecutorial discretion? A string of cases over the past few years has to make you wonder.

Prosecutorial discretion – the power to decide whether to bring criminal charges, who to charge, what crimes to charge, and how ultimately to resolve the case – is a fundamental component of the criminal justice system. The legislature enacts the laws but the executive branch enforces them, which includes making judgments about when and how to bring a criminal case.

On the macro level, this means setting national and local law enforcement priorities and making decisions about the deployment of finite prosecutorial resources. Different administrations at different times have declared areas such as health care fraud, narcotics, illegal immigration, or terrorism to be top priorities and have allocated resources accordingly. Such decisions necessarily mean other areas will not receive as much attention; a dollar spent fighting terrorism is a dollar that can’t be spent investigating mortgage fraud.

On the micro level, prosecutorial discretion involves deciding whether to pursue criminal charges in a given case and what charges to pursue. Factors such as the nature of the offense, strength of the evidence, the nature and extent of any harm, adequacy of other potential remedies, any mitigating circumstances or remedial efforts by the accused, and prosecutorial resources and priorities all may come into play.

For federal prosecutors, policies governing how they should exercise this discretion are set forth in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, and in particular in the Principles of Federal Prosecution. The Principles contain detailed guidance concerning when to bring charges, what kind of charges to bring, and how to handle criminal cases, in order to “promote the reasoned exercise of prosecutorial discretion by attorneys for the government.” USAM 9-27.110.

doj seal

Prosecutorial Discretion and White Collar Crime

Prosecutorial discretion is particularly important in white collar crime. With non-white collar, or “street” crimes, the parameters of the offense tend to be more clearly defined and charging decisions often are more black and white. If there is a body on the street with nine bullets in it, you pretty clearly have a homicide. If authorities can identify who did it, that person will almost certainly be charged. The prosecutor is not likely to say, “Due to our limited resources and other priorities, we’ll take a pass on this one and let the victim’s family file a civil suit instead” – not if the prosecutor wants to keep her job, anyway.

But white collar crime is full of gray areas. White collar prosecutors deal with sometimes nebulous concepts such as “fraud” and “corruption,” and white collar statutes are written in notoriously broad and general terms. As a result, it often falls much more to the prosecutor to determine whether something is a crime at all and to decide what kind of conduct merits a prosecution.

For example, suppose a hedge fund goes belly-up, and the investors who lost their money claim they were misled about their investment. Was it fraud, or was it merely aggressive – maybe even sleazy – sales tactics followed by incompetence, mismanagement, or just bad luck? Unlike a homicide, robbery, or drug case, at the outset it may not be clear that a crime has been committed. A prosecutor might well conclude, “If I investigated this for two years, perhaps at the end I would have a provable criminal fraud case – but perhaps not. Given my resources and priorities, I’m going to focus on other cases and let the SEC and private plaintiffs pursue civil and administrative penalties in this one.”

Given these potential gray areas, what’s the best way to deter and prosecute white collar crime? Imagine two different regimes. In System #1, Congress drafts broad statutes that proscribe conduct such as fraud in general terms, in order to encompass as much potentially criminal conduct as possible. It is left to the Executive Branch, through prosecutors, to enforce those statutes and determine which cases to pursue – with that discretion tempered, of course, by the oversight of the courts.

In System #2, Congress tries to write very precise and detailed statutes that are as specific as possible in defining the prohibited conduct. Such white collar statutes would leave fewer gray areas and less room for prosecutorial discretion – in other words, they would be more like street crimes. The downside of such a system would be that it necessarily creates loopholes: the more precisely you define criminal concepts like fraud, the greater the opportunity for individuals engaged in what should be criminal conduct to skirt the law’s prohibitions.

Historically, white collar criminal law has been closer to System #1: broad statutes prohibit things like fraud or corruption, and prosecutors are entrusted to exercise their discretion to determine how to apply those laws. But in a series of decisions over the past few years, the Supreme Court has signaled it is becoming increasingly uncomfortable with such a system. These decisions have limited several significant white collar statutes, moving us closer to System #2 – although with laws narrowed by the Court rather than by Congress. In the process, the Court has removed discretion from the hands of prosecutors while also making it more difficult to prosecute some criminal conduct.

The Supreme Court Limits Prosecutorial Discretion

The first such case was Skilling v. United States in 2010. Skilling involved the proper interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which prohibits schemes to deprive another of the “intangible right of honest services.” Honest services fraud, a species of mail and wire fraud, has been around for decades. Most cases of honest services fraud have involved relatively straightforward allegations of corruption such as bribery, kickbacks, and conflicts of interest.

But prosecutors in some cases stretched the boundaries of the theory, using honest services fraud to prosecute, for example, a university professor who helped students plagiarize work to obtain degrees to which they were not entitled; an IRS employee who improperly browsed through certain tax returns but did nothing with the information; state officials who awarded public sector jobs based on political patronage; and a state official who failed to disclose a potential conflict of interest when state law did not require disclosure. Some of these schemes seemed wrong or dishonest but were far from traditional criminal corruption. The confusion over what actually qualified as a deprivation of honest services led Justice Scalia to argue in 2009 that the law was in a state of “chaos.”

The Supreme Court finally attempted to bring some order out of this chaos in Skilling. The defendant, former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling, argued that the honest services statute should be struck down as unconstitutionally vague, but the Court disagreed. Instead, it limited the law to what it deemed the core of honest services fraud: cases involving bribery and kickbacks.

The holding in Skilling dramatically narrowed the scope of honest services fraud. This successfully removed prosecutors’ ability to use the theory in innovative ways to charge more unusual schemes. But the limitation also created safe harbors for certain conduct, such as self-dealing by elected officials, that is plainly corrupt but may no longer be charged as a violation of honest services.

In 2014, the Supreme Court decided Bond v. United States. (Although not really a white collar case, Bond is instructive as part of the same trend at the Court.) In Bond a jilted wife tried to injure her husband’s lover by sprinkling some caustic chemicals on her mailbox and doorknob. The chemicals caused only a slight skin irritation on the woman’s thumb that was easily treated with cold water. Federal prosecutors subsequently charged Bond using a felony statute that prohibits the use of chemical weapons and carries a penalty of “any term of years” in prison.

The Court ultimately held that the statute did not apply to Bond’s conduct. But an undercurrent of the case was the Court’s obvious concern over the government’s decision to apply a federal law aimed at preventing the horrors of chemical warfare to such a trivial incident. During oral argument, Justice Kennedy told the Solicitor General that it “seems unimaginable that you would bring this prosecution.” Justice Alito remarked, “If you told ordinary people that you were going to prosecute Ms. Bond for using a chemical weapon, they would be flabbergasted.”

This trend continued in 2015 with Yates v. United States. Yates was a commercial fisherman working in the Gulf of Mexico. A fish and wildlife officer boarded his boat to conduct a routine inspection and ended up citing him for having several dozen red grouper on board that were slightly smaller than the legal limit – a civil violation. The officer told Yates to keep the fish until he returned to port, where they would be seized and destroyed. Once the officer left his boat, however, Yates instructed a crew member to throw the undersized fish overboard and replace them with larger ones.

When this ultimately came to light, prosecutors charged Yates with three crimes including obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1519, a twenty-year felony. That law prohibits the destruction of “tangible objects” in an effort to obstruct a federal investigation. Captain Yates argued before the Supreme Court that fish were not “tangible objects” within the meaning of this statute. The Court ultimately ruled in his favor, but only by adopting what I believe was an unnatural and strained interpretation of the law.

But Yates is actually more significant for what it revealed about the Court’s views on prosecutorial discretion and charging decisions. During oral argument, the Justices were clearly disturbed by the application of a twenty-year felony to this fish-dumping episode. Justice Scalia asked what kind of “mad prosecutor” would charge Yates with a twenty-year offense, and sarcastically suggested perhaps it was the same prosecutor who had charged Bond with a chemical weapons violation. Later in the oral argument Justice Kennedy remarked, “It seems to me that we should just not use the concept [prosecutorial discretion] or refer to the concept at all anymore.”

The Court’s skepticism about prosecutorial discretion surfaced again this past spring in McDonnell v. United States. In reversing the corruption convictions of the former Virginia governor, the Court adopted a narrow definition of “official act” for purposes of federal bribery law. At oral argument and in its opinion the Court imagined federal prosecutors targeting elected officials for simply attending a lunch where a supporter bought them a bottle of wine, or for attending a ballgame as the guest of homeowners who earlier had sought the official’s help.

The narrow definition of “official act,” the Court concluded, was necessary to prevent politically-motivated prosecutions and the criminalization of routine political courtesies. But critics of the Court’s decision – including me – argue that the result is to shield a great deal of corrupt conduct that is precisely what the law of bribery aims to prevent.

The Future of Prosecutorial Discretion

In these recent cases, when faced with the interpretation of white collar crimes such as bribery, honest services fraud, and obstruction of justice, the Court’s approach has been to interpret the statutes narrowly and consequently to remove charging discretion from federal prosecutors. A moment during the Yates oral argument is particularly illuminating. The Justices asked Assistant Solicitor General Roman Martinez what guidance prosecutors followed when deciding what kind of charges to bring, and that led to this exchange:

MR.MARTINEZ:  Your Honor, the ­. . . my understanding of the U.S. Attorney’s Manual is that the general guidance that’s given is that the prosecutor should charge ­­once the decision is made to bring a criminal prosecution, the prosecutor should charge the ­­the offense that’s the most severe under the law. That’s not a hard and fast rule, but that’s kind of the default principle.  In this case that was Section 1519.

JUSTICE SCALIA:  Well, if that’s going to be the Justice Department’s position, then we’re going to have to be much more careful about how extensive statutes are.  I mean, if you’re saying we’re always going to prosecute the most severe, I’m going to be very careful about how severe I make statutes.

MR. MARTINEZ:  Your Honor, that’s ­­. . .

JUSTICE SCALIA:  Or ­­how much coverage I give to severe statutes.

MR. MARTINEZ:  That’s ­­– that’s not what we were saying.  I think we’re not always going to prosecute every case, and obviously we’re going to exercise our discretion. . . .

As Martinez attempted to point out, the real-world exercise of prosecutorial discretion is far more nuanced than Justice Scalia suggested. It’s true that the Principles of Federal Prosecution provide as a general rule – as they have for decades – that once a decision to bring charges is made a prosecutor generally should charge “the most serious offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant’s conduct, and that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction.” USAM 9-27.300. But the Principles also recognize the need for prosecutors to consider the nature and circumstances of a particular case, the purpose of criminal law, and law enforcement priorities. What charges are “consistent with the nature of the defendant’s conduct” is also a matter of judgment and discretion. And of course considerable discretion also is involved earlier in the process, when deciding whether to bring charges at all.

But this exchange suggests the Court may believe it needs to interpret criminal statutes more narrowly because it cannot always trust prosecutors to exercise sound judgment when enforcing broadly-written statutes. As Justice Kennedy suggested during the Yates argument, it may be that the Court no longer thinks of prosecutorial discretion as a viable concept.

Of course, some critics of federal prosecutors will welcome this development and suggest it is long overdue. And some will point out that, for prosecutors, this may be considered a self-inflicted wound. The charging decisions in cases like Yates and Bond in particular may be what led the Justices openly to question whether prosecutors should continue to be entrusted with the same degree of discretion.

But it would be unfortunate if the Justices truly come to believe they cannot rely on prosecutors to exercise sound judgment in charging decisions. One can always argue about the merits of particular cases, but overall our system of broadly-written statutes enforced by the sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion has worked pretty well. If the Court continues to chip away at those statutes due to concerns about controlling prosecutors, it will continue to create safe harbors for some conduct that is clearly criminal.

It’s particularly inappropriate for the Court to limit these statutes based on hypotheticals that have no basis in reality, as it did in McDonnell. When we start seeing widespread prosecutions of politicians for accepting legal campaign contributions and attending Rotary Club breakfasts, then maybe we can talk about the need to curb prosecutorial discretion. But simply because we can imagine a parade of horribles based on the broad terms of a white collar statute does not mean that prosecutors are actually marching in that parade.

At the McDonnell oral argument, Justice Breyer noted that narrowing the definition of bribery might mean that a certain amount of corrupt conduct will go unpunished. Unfortunately, for now that appears to be a risk the Court is willing to take.

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Third Circuit Rejects Senator Menendez Speech or Debate Claims

Update 9/13/16: Today the Third Circuit denied Menendez’s request for a rehearing en banc.  He likely will now seek review by the Supreme Court.

Update 3/20/17: Today the Supreme Court declined to hear Menendez’s appeal. The case will now go back to the trial court to proceed towards trial.

The Court of Appeals has rejected Sen. Menendez's Speech or Debate claims

Senator Bob Menendez

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit today rejected claims by New Jersey Senator Robert Menendez that the charges against him should be dismissed based on the speech or debate clause of the Constitution. Menendez and his co-defendant, Dr. Salomon Melgen, were indicted in April 2015 on multiple counts of corruption. The 22-count indictment charges that between 2006 and 2013 Menendez accepted numerous valuable gifts from Melgen, including multiple trips on a private jet, vacations at a luxury villa in the Dominican Republic, and hundreds of thousands of dollars in contributions to various campaign and legal defense funds.  In exchange, Menendez is alleged to have intervened on Melgen’s behalf in disputes with the Executive Branch, including an enforcement action by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services based on alleged massive overbilling by Melgen’s opthalmology practice and a dispute with the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol over Melgen’s multi-million dollar contract to provide cargo screening services in Dominican ports.  (For an analysis of the indictment and the charges, see my earlier post here.)

Menendez claims that various actions he took on behalf of Melgen, including meeting with Executive Branch officials to lobby on Melgen’s behalf, were “legislative acts” protected by the speech or debate clause and thus cannot be the basis of a criminal case. The trial court rejected those claims and Menendez appealed to the Third Circuit, where a three-judge panel has now unanimously rejected them as well. (For a more detailed discussion of the speech or debate clause and Menendez’s arguments, see my post here.)

The Third Circuit found that the evidence at this stage supports the government’s claim that Menendez was acting specifically on behalf of Melgen and was not, as he had argued, pursuing more general legislative or policy goals: “Record evidence and unrebutted allegations in the Indictment cause us to conclude that the District Court did not clearly err when it found that the challenged acts were informal attempts to influence the Executive Branch toward a political resolution of Dr. Melgen’s disputes and not primarily concerned with broader issues of policy.” (p. 29)  Although there was some evidence in the record supporting Menendez’s claims, the court found he had made selective use of the facts while ignoring other evidence that cut against him: “Senator Menendez’s selective reading of the materials in the record does not persuade us that the District Court clearly erred . . . .” (p. 36)

Two important points: this was merely a pretrial determination, where allegations of the indictment were presumed to be true and Menendez had the burden of proof. As the Court of Appeals recognized, after all of the evidence comes out at trial it is possible that Menendez will ultimately prevail on his speech or debate arguments (although it seems unlikely). In addition, this appeal dealt only with the speech or debate claims and a couple of collateral issues; Menendez may still raise many other legal defenses both before and during trial. In particular, it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court’s recent decision reversing the corruption conviction of former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell will end up helping Menendez as well.

The Third Circuit’s decision was not a surprise; the speech or debate arguments always seemed like a long shot. The claims will, however, continue to delay the ultimate resolution of the case. Menendez will now likely ask the entire Third Circuit to review the panel decision en banc, and if that fails will petition the Supreme Court to hear the case. Even if those appeals are ultimately unsuccessful, it looks like his trial likely will be delayed well into 2017. Sidebars will keep you posted.

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