The Status of the Michael Flynn Case

Update: On June 24, 2020, in a 2-1 decision, the D.C. Circuit granted the petition for mandamus and ordered Judge Sullivan to dismiss the case. Sullivan or one of the circuit judges may request en banc review by the full court.

The Michael Flynn case is no longer just about a senior government official who lied to the FBI. The prosecution of president Trump’s former national security advisor has become a symbolic struggle over the separation of powers and a showcase for allegations of corruption within the Trump Justice Department. Regardless of the outcome of these court proceedings, Flynn is unlikely ever to see the inside of a jail cell. But how the case plays out over the next few weeks will be an important test of the ability – and willingness – of the judiciary to push back against the Trump administration’s abuse of the justice system.

Michael Flynn
Michael Flynn

Procedural History of the Flynn Case

Flynn pleaded guilty in December 2017 to one count of lying to the FBI. During his guilty plea, Flynn admitted under oath that he had lied to FBI agents about his contacts with the Russian ambassador in December 2016 on behalf of the incoming Trump administration. He confirmed his guilt under oath a second time after his case was transferred to judge Emmet Sullivan. Flynn’s sentencing was substantially delayed while he cooperated with the government during the Mueller investigation.

Once the Mueller probe was concluded, however, Flynn changed his tune. Last summer he fired his respected defense team from the leading D.C. firm of Covington & Burling and hired Sydney Powell, a vocal DOJ critic and Fox News regular. In recent months Powell moved to withdraw Flynn’s guilty plea and to have the charges dismissed, claiming Flynn was an innocent victim of government misconduct. Those motions are still pending before Judge Sullivan.

But the real bombshell in the case landed last month. On May 7 the Justice Department filed a motion to dismiss Flynn’s case. After defending Flynn’s prosecution in court for more than two years, DOJ told the court it now believed Flynn had not actually committed a crime and never should have been prosecuted in the first place.

In response to this startling motion, Judge Sullivan made it clear he wasn’t simply going to accept the government’s claims at face value. Since Flynn and the DOJ were now on the same side, Sullivan appointed a respected former federal judge, John Gleeson, to present any legal arguments against the government’s motion. He also asked Gleeson to advise him on whether Flynn should be charged with contempt for lying during his plea proceedings.

Rather than wait for Judge Sullivan to rule, on May 19 Flynn’s attorney took the unusual step of asking the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to issue a writ of mandamus – an order telling Sullivan that he has to grant the motion to dismiss without any further proceedings or delay. The court of appeals asked to hear arguments on the mandamus petition, and Sullivan appointed prominent D.C. attorney Beth Wilkinson to represent him. The Justice Department filed a brief in support of Flynn, and the court of appeals heard arguments on the mandamus petition on Friday, June 12.

As of today, the posture of the case is that Sullivan has a hearing set for July 16 on the motion to dismiss. But before that happens, we expect to hear from the D.C. Circuit on whether it will grant Flynn’s petition for mandamus. If it does, it will order Sullivan to grant the motion and the case will be over. If the circuit court denies the petition, Sullivan will hold the hearing and then either grant the motion to dismiss or deny it and set Flynn’s case for sentencing.

There are two different types of issues presented by these various legal maneuvers: the merits and the process. The merits issue is whether the government’s motion to dismiss should be granted and how much discretion, if any, Judge Sullivan has to review the government’s purported reasons for the dismissal. The process issue is who gets to decide those questions in the first instance: Judge Sullivan, or the Court of Appeals?

U.S. District Judge Emmet Sullivan

Who Gets to Decide?

The process issue is far easier. There are definitely novel and difficult questions raised by the government’s motion to dismiss. But in the ordinary course of legal proceedings, it’s the trial judge who gets to decide those issues first. Sullivan may well end up granting the motion to dismiss, and the case will be over. If he denies the motion, Flynn could appeal to the D.C. Circuit at that time. But there is no justification for the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus, which would allow Flynn (and the government) improperly to sidestep the proceedings before Sullivan.

Flynn and the DOJ argue that mandamus is appropriate because Judge Sullivan has no discretion here. There is no longer an active dispute before the court, because both the defense and the prosecution agree they want the case dismissed. Because the executive branch has sole discretion to decide whether to prosecute, they argue, the judge lacks the constitutional authority to keep the case alive.

One difficulty with this argument is that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), which governs motions to dismiss, says the government may dismiss a case only “with leave of court.” As Judge Wilkins repeatedly pointed out during the D.C. Circuit argument on Friday, that language must mean something. It suggests there is a role for the court to play and that the judge is not merely a rubber stamp. Attorneys for Powell and the DOJ have struggled to explain how “with leave of court” actually means that the court has no choice.

Whether a judge has the authority to deny a motion to dismiss that is agreed to by both sides is an unsettled question. In Rinaldi v. United States the Supreme Court stated:

The words “leave of court” were inserted in Rule 48(a) without explanation. While they obviously vest some discretion in the court, the circumstances in which that discretion may properly be exercised have not been delineated by this Court. The principal object of the “leave of court” requirement is apparently to protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment, e.g., charging, dismissing, and recharging, when the Government moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant’s objection. But the Rule has also been held [by lower courts] to permit the court to deny a Government dismissal motion to which the defendant has consented if the motion is prompted by considerations clearly contrary to the public interest. (emphasis added, citations omitted)

That’s the issue presented in Flynn’s case: whether Judge Sullivan has the authority to deny the motion to dismiss based on a finding that the motion was prompted by “considerations clearly contrary to the public interest” – namely corruption within the DOJ and the fact that Flynn is a political ally of president Trump’s.  The Supreme Court did not decide in Rinaldi whether a judge has that kind of authority, and that question remains unresolved.

The Need for “Regular Order”

The fact that Sullivan’s authority is unsettled is why the mandamus petition should be denied. Mandamus is an extraordinary and unusual remedy. It requires the law to be so clear that there is no possible debate about the proper outcome; the movant must be “clearly and indisputably” entitled to relief and have no other adequate remedy. That’s simply not true in this case. The legal standards governing this motion are unresolved, not “clear and indisputable,” and Flynn has an adequate remedy: let the judge decide his motion, as in any other case.

As Judge Henderson repeatedly pointed out during the D.C. Circuit argument, “regular order” demands that the trial judge, Judge Sullivan, gets to decide those difficult issues in the first instance. That will allow the facts to be fully developed and the arguments on both sides to be heard, and will allow Sullivan to make findings of fact and rulings of law. An appeal to the D.C. Circuit could then follow, if necessary. That’s how our court system works. You don’t get an exception for being the president’s pal.

The mandamus petition argues that Sullivan has no authority to deny the motion to dismiss. Sullivan may well end up agreeing. But Flynn is saying Sullivan can’t even consider the question; can’t even hear the arguments on both sides and make a decision. That’s wrong.

I think the D.C. Circuit is likely to deny the mandamus petition. Judge Sullivan should get to decide the motion to dismiss before the court of appeals gets involved.

Former federal judge John Gleeson

The Merits of the Motion to Dismiss

On the merits, the government’s motion to dismiss is remarkably weak. Judge Gleeson, the amicus appointed by Judge Sullivan, concluded that the arguments advanced by the government are “pretextual” and that the motion is “riddled with inexplicable and elementary errors of law and fact.” I think Gleeson is correct. The legal arguments are frankly laughable. They are also inconsistent with arguments the government itself has made repeatedly over the more than two years this case has been pending.

The government argues first that it now does not believe Flynn’s lies to the FBI were material, as required by the false statements statute. But materiality is a very low bar — a statement need only have the potential to influence some government decision. Flynn’s lies to the FBI about his Russian contacts, made in connection with the FBI’s investigation of Russia and the Trump campaign, easily meet that standard. As Judge Gleeson put it: 

In short, pursuant to an active investigation into whether President Trump’s campaign officials coordinated activities with the Government of Russia, one of those officials lied to the FBI about coordinating activities with the Government of Russia. It is hard to conceive of a more material false statement than this one.

The government claims the lies could not be material because they were not related to a properly predicated investigation of Flynn. This too is nonsense. You don’t have to be the subject of an active investigation yourself to lie to the FBI, or for the FBI to have a reason to interview you. Whether a particular investigation was properly opened or was about to be closed are, as Judge Gleeson noted, simply matters of “bureaucratic happenstance that had no bearing on whether the FBI could or should interview Flynn” about his Russian contacts. In other words, even if the FBI screws up some internal paperwork or procedure before your interview, you don’t get a free pass to lie.

The government also claims it now believes it could not prove that Flynn intentionally lied. Of course, it doesn’t have to prove that, because Flynn himself has already admitted it repeatedly, under oath. He also lied to others in the Trump administration, which is why he was fired after only a couple of weeks on the job. In his brief, Judge Gleeson describes in meticulous detail the various false statements Flynn made during his interview and why they were false.

Judge Sullivan has already ruled – agreeing with earlier arguments made by the prosecutors – that Flynn’s statements were material. Flynn himself has repeatedly acknowledged under oath that he lied to the agents. But the government now claims it could not prove materiality or that Flynn lied. It’s easy to see why Gleeson concluded that the government’s arguments are legally unsound and are a transparent effort to drop the case simply to benefit an ally of president Trump.

What Should Sullivan Do?

The legal arguments in support of the government’s motion to dismiss may be laughable, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that Sullivan should, or can, deny the motion. As noted above, the “leave of court” requirement in Rule 48(a) indicates the court does not have to simply serve as a rubber stamp in the face of such obviously pretextual arguments for dismissal. And the Supreme Court’s footnote in Rinaldi at least notes the possibility that the motion could be denied if contrary to the public interest. But when both the prosecutor and defense agree a case should be dismissed, can the judge really insist that the case go forward?  And what would that look like?

In his brief filed on June 10, Judge Gleeson argued that Sullivan should deny the motion and proceed to sentence Flynn. Gleeson pulled no punches, accusing the DOJ of a “gross abuse of prosecutorial power.” He argued that the motion to dismiss was an “unconvincing effort to disguise as legitimate a decision to dismiss that is based solely on the fact that Flynn is a political ally of President Trump.”

As Gleeson points out, the integrity of the judicial branch is at stake here too. The judge is not required to be complicit if he finds an abuse of the prosecutor’s authority:

The Executive Branch had the unreviewable discretion to never charge Flynn with acrime because he is a friend and political ally of President Trump. President Trump today has the unreviewable authority to issue a pardon, thus ensuring that Flynn is no longer prosecuted and never punished for his crimes because he is a friend and political ally. But the instant the Executive Branch filed a criminal charge against Flynn, it forfeited the right to implicate this Court in the dismissal of that charge simply because Flynn is a friend and political ally of the President. Avoiding precisely that unseemly outcome is why Rule 48(a) requires “leave of court.” 

Gleeson argues that accepting the government’s false reasons for dismissal would undermine the public’s confidence in the rule of law by demonstrating that the Trump DOJ may act to benefit the president’s political cronies with impunity.

Admittedly, denying a motion to dismiss supported by both sides could present difficulties in some cases. As Flynn and the government’s lawyers argued in the D.C. Circuit, a judge has no mechanism to compel prosecutors to move forward with a case they want to dismiss. But in the current posture of Flynn’s case, that’s not really an issue. Flynn’s prosecution is essentially over; there is nothing more that prosecutors need to do. All that remains is sentencing, and prosecutors have already filed memoranda setting forth their positions on that. Sullivan could easily proceed to sentence Flynn even if the current prosecutors decline to speak at the hearing.

I don’t know how Judge Sullivan will ultimately decide the motion to dismiss. I wouldn’t be surprised if he grants it in the end. But if he does, it won’t be because the government is right on the merits. It will be because he agrees that in our constitutional structure the executive branch has absolute authority over decisions to prosecute. He may rule that even if a prosecution is dropped for corrupt reasons, the remedy has to lie elsewhere. The remedy is not to try to force the prosecution to proceed — which, in most cases if not this one, would be impossible anyway. But if Sullivan decides a judge does indeed have the authority to deny a motion to dismiss because it is contrary to the public interest, he will likely deny the motion. The posture and facts of this case make it a great candidate for such a denial.

Won’t Trump Just Pardon Flynn Anyway?

Many feel that this entire proceeding is an exercise in futility. After all, even if Sullivan ended up denying the motion to dismiss, sentenced Flynn to prison, and that was upheld on appeal, it seems almost certain that president Trump would step in and pardon him. So as I mentioned at the outset, no matter how this all turns out, Flynn is unlikely ever to see the inside of a jail cell.

But regardless, this is a case where the process is important. It’s important first to uphold the principle that the president’s buddies, just like everyone else, have to pursue “regular order” in the court system. They don’t get to go over the head of a judge whose rulings they might not like and get the court of appeals to order the judge to rule their way. They need to play by the rules, present their arguments to the judge, and then appeal if necessary, just like everyone else.

Denial of the motion followed by a pardon would actually be a better result because, oddly enough, it’s more honest. If Trump wants to exercise his pardon power to benefit his political allies, he should have to take whatever political heat goes along with that. The motion to dismiss was Attorney General Barr’s attempt to do Trump’s dirty work for him – to get Flynn off the hook by pretending that justice demanded it. That should not be allowed. If Trump wants to use his power corruptly to benefit his political crony, he should have to own it.

Finally, even if Sullivan ultimately grants the motion, holding a hearing where the government has to defend the motion will provide a public airing of the government’s actions and purported reasons for the dismissal. Those who argue Sullivan must grant the motion say that even if there is corruption underlying the motion, the remedy is for the public to hold that against the politically-accountable executive branch. But that accountability can’t happen if the true reasons for the dismissal remain concealed.

During the D.C. Circuit argument, the government’s attorney objected to the idea of a hearing where the government may “have to explain itself.” That objection is telling. The “leave of court” requirement must mean, at the very least, that Judge Sullivan is entitled to an explanation. He’s entitled to explore why the government has reversed course after pursuing a case before him for more than two years. By accepting briefs, holding a hearing, and issuing a ruling containing findings of fact, Judge Sullivan can shine some sunlight on DOJ’s misconduct, even if he ultimately grants the motion. That will provide voters with information they can use to evaluate the conduct of Trump’s DOJ when they go to the polls in November.

In the end, that might be the most helpful outcome of all.

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Bridgegate and Flynngate

Last Thursday was an eventful day in the white collar world. In the morning the Supreme Court decided Kelly v. United States, the “Bridgegate” case, a significant ruling concerning the scope of federal mail and wire fraud. Then in the afternoon came word that the Department of Justice had moved to drop the case against Trump’s former national security advisor Michael Flynn. The Bridgegate decision was not a surprise, and I think the Court got it right. As for the Flynn case, DOJ’s action was deeply troubling and, frankly, dishonest — the latest demonstration of Attorney General William Barr’s politicization of the DOJ.

Former NJ Governor Chris Christie

The Bridgegate Decision

The facts of Bridgegate are familiar by now. In September 2013, officials at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey closed two of the three inbound lanes on the George Washington Bridge that spans the Hudson River between New Jersey and Manhattan. This caused several days of severe traffic gridlock that paralyzed the town of Fort Lee, New Jersey. School buses were unable to transport students, first responders had trouble responding to calls, and tens of thousands of commuters were stuck in hours-long traffic jams.

When the incident was investigated, officials falsely claimed they had closed the lanes to conduct a traffic study. The true purpose was to punish the Democratic mayor of Fort Lee for refusing to endorse then-Republican Governor Chris Christie for re-election. The scandal caused severe political damage to Christie, who once had presidential ambitions. Christie himself was not prosecuted, but federal prosecutors did charge his Deputy Chief of Staff Bridget Anne Kelly and Port Authority official William Baroni with fraud for their role in the scheme. They were convicted at trial and sentenced to prison.

The issue in the case was never whether or not the defendants had misbehaved. Everyone agrees their actions were deplorable. The issue was whether it was criminal, and in particular, whether it was federal fraud. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court ruled it was not.

Before 2010, prosecutors almost certainly would have charged this case as honest services fraud. That popular theory charged defendants with scheming to deprive victims of the intangible right of fair and honest services that they were owed by someone – most often by a public official. The theory was used to prosecute a wide range of political misconduct that was not necessarily otherwise illegal. But in the 2010 case of Skilling v. United States, the Court ruled that honest services fraud must be limited to cases involving the payment of bribes or kickbacks – core corruption. There were no bribes or kickbacks involved here.

With honest services fraud off the table, prosecutors chose to charge the bridge-closing scheme as wire fraud and federal program fraud. Those fraud statutes require proof that the defendant sought to deprive the victim of money or property. Prosecutors had two different theories. The first was that the defendants had “commandeered” the bridge lanes to carry out their scheme and had thereby deprived the Port Authority of its property. The second was that the defendants had deprived the Port Authority of the salaries of the employees whose labor was necessary to execute the scheme, such as those who manned the toll collection booths.

The Limits of Fraud

The Supreme Court rejected both arguments. The Court first held the defendants did not deprive the Port Authority of property by shifting the bridge lanes. It relied primarily on a 2000 case called Cleveland v. United States. In Cleveland the defendants were convicted of defrauding the state of Louisiana when they obtained video poker licenses by lying on the license application forms. The Court  threw out those convictions, holding that an unissued license was not property in the hands of the state and so could not support a fraud conviction. The state’s interest in the unissued licenses was a regulatory interest, not a property one.

The Court in Bridgegate held that the same was true of the bridge lanes. The Port Authority was not deprived of any property; it still controlled the lanes and collected the tolls. All the defendants did was re-allocate the use of the lanes by different drivers. Like issuing a license, that is a government regulatory power, not a property interest. Even if the defendants made that decision for a bad reason and lied about it, that did not deprive the Port Authority of property for purposes of the fraud statutes.   

The Court likewise rejected the claim that the defendants had deprived the Port Authority of the salaries of the employees who carried out the scheme. Those employees were still doing the work they were hired to do, moving cones and collecting tolls. If the defendants lied about the true reason for having the employees carry out particular tasks, that was not enough to constitute fraud. The object of a fraud scheme must be to obtain money or property; here the object was to create a traffic jam. Salary payments to Port Authority employees were merely incidental side-effects of that scheme. For the payment of those salaries to constitute a fraud, the defendants would have had to order the employees to perform some personal task for them unrelated to their Port Authority duties. That was not the case here.

Not All Misconduct Is Criminal

Bridgegate was the latest example of federal prosecutors trying to use expansive fraud theories to pursue political misconduct that was not otherwise clearly criminal. The Bridgegate defendants did not use their public positions for personal financial gain, as in a bribery case. Closing the lanes was not otherwise illegal our outside of their authority. They just lied about why they were doing it. But politicians routinely lie – or more politely, engage in “spin” – about why they are taking actions that are otherwise within the scope of their duties. Without more, such political misconduct is usually not considered criminal.

Even if the conduct here could have been criminal, the Court said that was a matter for New Jersey state authorities, not the federal government. The Court expressly noted it was possible New Jersey criminal remedies could apply, and that “federal fraud law leaves much public corruption to the States (or their electorates) to rectify.” Even absent a state prosecution, the state’s residents have remedies at the ballot box and can exact political penalties, as they did by tanking Governor Christie’s career. But ever since the McNally case first rejected the sweeping honest services fraud theory in 1987, the Court has been wary of allowing federal prosecutors to use federal fraud statutes to set “standards of disclosure and good government for state and local officials.”

I’ve been critical of a number of the Court’s recent public corruption decisions, but I think they got Bridgegate right. This was bad and harmful behavior, but it wasn’t federal fraud. If the case had gone the other way, then almost any case of state or local political mischief could be the subject of a federal criminal prosecution, because there will almost always be a salary paid to someone in connection with it. Federal prosecutors should not try to stretch fraud theories to cover local political hardball that can be handled at the local level, either by state prosecutors or by the voters. More broadly, I think Bridgegate was one of several recent high-profile cases where the appropriate remedy was probably not a criminal prosecution.

Michael Flynn
Michael Flynn

The Flynn Motion to Dismiss

In last Thursday’s other news, the government filed a motion to dismiss the criminal case against former national security advisor Michael Flynn. Flynn pleaded guilty in December 2017 to lying to the FBI about his contacts with the Russian ambassador on behalf of the incoming Trump administration. He cooperated extensively with the government during the Mueller investigation. But in 2019, after the Mueller probe was completed, Flynn changed his mind.  He fired his attorneys from the top D.C. law firm of Covington and Burling and hired Sydney Powell, a vocal DOJ critic and Fox News regular. She began an aggressive campaign to withdraw Flynn’s guilty plea and have the case dismissed based on alleged government misconduct.

Attorney General Barr recently appointed the U.S. Attorney from St. Louis, Jeff Jensen, to review the handling of Flynn’s case. Now, reportedly on Jensen’s recommendation, Barr has decided DOJ should drop the Flynn case altogether and that it never should have been brought in the first place. But the government’s arguments in support of this motion to dismiss are dishonest and disingenuous.

Flynn pleaded guilty to one count of false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1001. DOJ now claims it doesn’t believe that Flynn’s false statements were material. Materiality is a very low bar. To be material, a false statement does not need to actually affect any government decision, it only needs to be the type of statement that has the potential to do so.

DOJ says that Flynn’s lies about his contacts with the Russian ambassador could not have been material because the FBI did not have a legitimate reason to interview him. At the time of Flynn’s interview, the FBI was conducting an investigation, code-named Crossfire Hurricane, into the Trump campaign’s contacts with Russia and Russian interference in the election. It had a separate, related investigation into Flynn and his own Russian contacts, code-named Crossfire Razor. Having found nothing incriminating, the FBI was preparing to close Crossfire Razor when it learned about Flynn’s contacts with the Russian ambassador on behalf of the president-elect. In light of that new information, the FBI decided to keep the investigation of Flynn open until it could interview him about those contacts.

Flynn’s supporters have characterized this sequence of events as nefarious and as evidence that Flynn was “set up.” And DOJ has now said it basically agrees. It claims that, having decided to close the Flynn investigation, there was no good reason for the FBI to interview him, even after learning the new information about his conversations with the Russian ambassador. And because the interview was therefore not properly predicated, DOJ says, any lies that Flynn may have told could not possibly have been material.

Flynn’s Statements Were Material

This is nonsense on several different levels. First, whether or not the FBI had properly opened or closed an internal case file has nothing to do with whether Flynn lied about something that matters. If the FBI screws up some internal docket entry it doesn’t mean a witness gets a free pass to lie. I don’t know of any case where a false statement to the FBI was found not to be criminal because the interview was not “properly predicated.” Why the FBI is talking to you and whether you choose to tell material falsehoods are completely unrelated.

Second, you don’t have to be investigating someone personally to have a reason to interview them. Even if the FBI believed Flynn himself was not a security risk and they should close their file on him, there would still be reason to talk to him in connection with Crossfire Hurricane. It would be an odd investigative world where the only people the FBI was allowed to speak to were those who were personally under investigation. People who are interviewed and are not under investigation are known as “witnesses.” And Flynn was, at the very least, an important witness to Trump-Russia contacts who needed to be interviewed.

Whether or not the Crossfire Razor file was properly open or closed, the FBI had every reason to talk to Flynn as part of the broader Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Remember, the focus of that investigation was Russian contacts with the Trump campaign. Flynn had been a part of the campaign, and the FBI had just learned that he had recent contacts with the Russian ambassador. How could the agents possibly ignore that? 

Flynn lied to the FBI by denying he asked the Russian ambassador not to retaliate based on the sanctions the Obama administration had imposed on Russia in December 2016. Why was he having that conversation?  Who asked him to do it? Was there a possible link between the incoming administration promising to ease up on Russia and the Russian help for Trump during the election? There’s no question the FBI had a good reason to talk to Flynn, and that Flynn’s lies about his conversations with the ambassador had the potential to influence the FBI’s fledgling investigation into the Trump-Russia connection. That’s all that materiality requires.

What’s more, Judge Emmet Sullivan, the judge in Flynn’s case, has already ruled that Flynn’s statements were material. He made that ruling when denying Flynn’s earlier motion to dismiss based on alleged government misconduct. But the government now says (in a footnote) that doesn’t really count because the judge didn’t have all of the relevant facts before him – even though nothing in the government’s motion to dismiss should come as any news to the judge, and none of the supposedly “new” facts affect materiality.

The government also now claims, somewhat half-heartedly, that Flynn’s answers were not clearly lies, that they were “equivocal” or “indirect.” Again, this flatly contradicts both the evidence in the case and the position taken by the government for the past two years. And Flynn himself has admitted under oath  – twice — that he knowingly lied to the FBI. But as with Judge Sullivan, prosecutors now suggest that Flynn didn’t really know what he was doing.

As I wrote in my Washington Post column about the Flynn motion:

So to sum up: The government claims it cannot prove materiality when the judge has already ruled the lies were material, and the government says it cannot prove Flynn lied when he has already admitted twice that he lied. Such a bizarre argument could be put forward only in a Trumpian world where facts truly don’t matter.

The Politicization of the DOJ

The reaction by former Department of Justice officials to the Flynn motion has been almost uniformly negative. Former U.S. Attorney Chuck Rosenberg wrote in the Washington Post that there’s a long list of people who thought Flynn’s lies were material – including Trump himself. Mary McCord, Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the time of Flynn’s interview, wrote in the New York Times that the investigation and interview of Flynn were entirely appropriate and justified, that his lies were material, and that DOJ had wrongly twisted her words in the motion to suggest otherwise. Jonathan Kravis, one of the career prosecutors who resigned from the Roger Stone case when Barr intervened at Stone’s sentencing, wrote that the Flynn motion to dismiss was another “disastrous mistake” highlighting the politicization of the DOJ. And more than two thousand former DOJ officials of both parties signed an open letter protesting Barr’s actions and urging Judge Sullivan to scrutinize them carefully.

Attorney General William Barr

This Flynn motion is similar to the Roger Stone incident in a number of ways. In both cases, the career prosecutors assigned to the case withdrew in protest after they were undermined by the Attorney General’s intervention. In both cases that intervention was signed off on by acting U.S. Attorney for D.C. Timothy Shea, a longtime Barr aide who was recently installed to replace the former U.S. Attorney Jessie Liu. Both incidents involved attempts to undermine or discredit cases brought by the Trump’s nemesis, special counsel Robert S. Mueller. And both involved personal intervention by the U.S. Attorney General to benefit political allies of the president, in ways that would never happen with an ordinary defendant.

It will be very interesting now to see how Judge Sullivan acts on the motion. He has a number of options. The rules say the case may be dismissed only with “leave of court.” It would be rare for a judge to buck a prosecutor’s decision to drop a case – but this is far from a typical case. Judges don’t like to be manipulated, and you can imagine Judge Sullivan demanding that DOJ officials explain in person what exactly changed that caused them to drop a case they had defended for two years. As a sign that this may not be over, on May 12 Judge Sullivan issued an order essentially inviting outside parties to file amicus brief about what he should do. A group of sixteen former Watergate prosecutors has already filed a motion seeking permission to do so.

Regardless of the outcome, this is an outrageous and disheartening demonstration of the current rot at the Department of Justice. It’s more clear than ever that Barr sees his role as protecting the president and manipulating the justice system to benefit Trump’s political cronies. There is one brand of justice for the president’s friends, and another brand for everyone else. Barr’s decision also protects Trump from taking the political heat that would come if he were to pardon Flynn; instead, Barr will simply drop the case while claiming that’s what justice requires.

This latest incident makes one fear what else is coming. You can almost guarantee that between now and the election there will be reports “revealing” that the entire Mueller investigation was a hoax and an attempt by the FBI and the Obama/Biden administration to take down Trump. And I wouldn’t be surprised to see the announcement of some kind of criminal investigation of Joe Biden or his family. As others have pointed out, for an authoritarian the first step is using the justice system to benefit your friends. The next step is using it to investigate and punish your enemies.

That’s why what is happening is so frightening – and so dangerous.

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